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Executive Summary  
The improved terms of trade for Indonesia, as a result of the sharp exchange 
rate depreciation after the 1997/98 economic crisis, was expected to improve the 
country’s export performance. As documented by some studies, however, the 
evidence conflicts the prediction. Although some explanations have been offered in 
the literature, those which focus on firm behaviour are scarce, and almost all of these 
concentrate on macroeconomic factors. This study attempts to fill this gap and aims to 
draw some lessons from Indonesia’s experience, by examining the export-supply 
response of firms in Indonesian manufacturing. The study asks two questions. First, 
what is the picture of export-supply response of firms in Indonesian manufacturing 
during and after the 1997/98 economic crisis?, and second, which factors determine 
the firms’ export-supply response?  
 
Utilising the rich plant level data of non-oil and gas manufacturing, the 
descriptive analysis suggests that, among other, the strong persistency might have 
been the main explanation for the sluggish export performance. In other words, the 
lack of export response could be caused by the inability of firms in immediately 
engaging in export activities.  
 
The description is confirmed by the econometric analysis. Being able to 
provide a more robust quantitative method, the econometric analysis is able to provide 
more insights into the issue. The following are the main points from the econometric 
analysis. First, the improved terms of trade from the exchange rate depreciation is 
likely to have been captured only by plants which had been exporting prior to crisis. 
This suggests it is likely to observe a success response from firms that have had some 
exporting experience, but not necessarily so for firms that sell their entire output to the 
domestic market. The redirection is likely to happen but with a lag. Second, the 
unsuccessful export supply response may have been because firms were not ready or 
not prepared to enter export markets. Third, the analysis support the Blomstrom and 
Lipsey’s (1993) proposition that it is easier for foreign firms to increase their export 
or redirect sales in the event of positive economic shock.  
 
The in-depth interviews provide more insights into the topic by supplementing 
the finding from the statistical analysis. Three main findings were derived. First, the 
availability of networks determines the success of firms in responding to the improved 
terms of trade. The interviews suggest companies that engage in industrial networks 
performed relatively better in terms of exports during and after crisis, than those that 
did not. Second, limited access to capital and deteriorated infrastructure were often 
mentioned as the main constraints for a successful response. Third, unlike what is 
commonly believed, the role of trade facilitators does not appear to have given 
significant positive impact to firm export supply response. This study suggests the 
role of trade facilitators could be industry specific.  
 
The findings from this study are clearly relevant for policy making in 
Indonesia. The major implication is that the policy should be focused on encouraging 
firms to start exporting, even if a firm is domestically oriented. The reason for this is   ii
obvious. The empirical analyses indicate and confirm that exporting in Indonesian 
manufacturing is costly and could be very slow business activity to be initiated. 
 
Encouraging firms to start exporting could be done in many ways. One, which also 
indicated by the empirical findings, is by attracting much higher flow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Again, the reason is obvious, foreign ownership is shown to have 
been important for shaping a successful export supply response after the crisis. An 
important policy action is streamlining the procedure and process for establishing 
business or exporting from Indonesia. As also noted in many reports, Indonesia 
currently stays at the bottom of the global ranking in this particular area. 
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I. Introduction 
Indonesia enjoyed a more competitive terms of trade during and after the 
1997/98 economic crisis, as a result of sharp exchange rate depreciation in 1998. The 
real effective exchange rates in the early 2000s were still considerably below their 
pre-crisis level, although they had been appreciating in the last few years. The 
exchange rate for the period 1999-2003, for example, on average was about 25 per 
cent lower than its real value in the 1996 (before the crisis). The better terms of trade 
was expected to have improved the country’s export performance. However, several 
studies (e.g. Dwor-Frecaut et al. 2000; Duttagupta and Spilimbergo 2004; World 
Bank 2000) have demonstrated that the evidence conflicts this prediction. The growth 
of non-oil and gas exports in terms of value contracted by 4 per cent in 1998 (the peak 
of the crisis) and was about 2 per cent on average for the period 2000-2003, which 
was considerable low compared to about 12 per cent average growth during the period 
1991-95 (pre-crisis period). 
 
Although some explanations have been offered in the literature, those which 
focus on firm behaviour are scarce, and almost all of these concentrate on 
macroeconomic factors. This study attempts to fill this gap and aims to draw some 
lessons from Indonesia’s experience, by examining the export-supply response of 
firms in Indonesian manufacturing. It asks, in particular, two questions. First, what is 
the picture of export-supply response of firms in Indonesian manufacturing during and 
after the 1997/98 economic crisis?, and second, which factors determine the firms’ 
export-supply response? The second question essentially builds on the first, based on 
the empirical findings discussed in the study. 
 
The study utilises a rich annual data set on medium and large plants in the 
Indonesian manufacturing from 1993 to 2004, which covers the high-growth pre-crisis 
period, the peak of the crisis and the recovery period. The choice of manufacturing 
industry was motivated mainly because of the data availability, and the fact that the 
industry had been the major source of Indonesia’s export growth in the last two 
decades before the crisis (Hill 1996). The study adopts both quantitative and 
qualitative method. The former draws some descriptive statistics and conducts an 
econometric analysis, utilising the plant-level data. The latter, meanwhile, conducts a 
case study of few firms in textile-and-garment and electronics industry, by way of 
interviewing the senior managers of these firms. The case study aims to supplement to 
supplement the results from quantitative method.  
 
This report is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant theoretical 
and empirical literature. Section 3 describes the methodology adopted by this study, 
including the description of the data base and list of topics for the firm-level 
interviews. Section 4 presents the results and analysis, consisting of the descriptive 
analysis, econometric analysis, and the results of the firm-level interviews. Finally 
Section 5 summarises the study, concludes, and outlines few possible policy 
implications.  
   2
II. Literature Review 
2.1  Overview of the macroeconomic situation during the 1990s and the 
early 2000s 
 
This sub-section describes the performance of several macroeconomic 
indicators between the 1990s and 2000s, focusing on the impact of crisis and the 
macroeconomic performance after the crisis. The motivation for the description is 
twofold. First, export performance of a country does not only depend on the 
characteristics of industry and firm, but also on an overall macroeconomic 
performance. Second, it is important to provide the reader with background 
information about the macroeconomic situation during the period of the sluggish 
export-supply response. 
 
2.1.1 Economic  growth 
 
The crisis severely affected Indonesia’s economy. The economy contracted by 
14.1 per cent in 1998 after growing rapidly in the 30 years before the crisis (see 
Figure 2.1). In historical context, the contraction in 1998 was far deeper than any 
other recession that Indonesia had experienced (Hill 1999). The severe impact of the 
crisis appears even harsher when the short-term trend in the GDP is considered. The 
GDP index in the figure shows that the level of the GDP in 1998 was about the same 
of that in 1995, implying that the crisis had ‘cost’ Indonesia three years of economic 
growth. 
 


















GDP growth Index of GDP (1993=100)
Source: National Income Statistics, Indonesia.
 
 
In spite of the deep contraction, the economy began to recover in 1999, which 
was indicated by 0.8 per cent growth in they year. By 2000, the rate of growth was 
back to the 1997 rate at the beginning of the crisis, although well below the pre-crisis 
trend growth. 
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The momentum of recovery, however, was only short-lived. The growth fell 
by about 2 per cent in the following year, and was only picking up at much slower 
than the pre-crisis period. The latter is shown by a much-lower slope of the over-time 
growth trend over the period 2001-04, compared to the trend over the early 1990s to 
just before the crisis. 
 
Table 2.1 shows that the impact of the crisis was different across sectors in the 
economy. Focusing first on the peak of the crisis (1998) construction, finance and 
trade, hotel and restaurant were the most severely affected sectors. The massive 
contraction in construction sector was probably caused by the delay of many projects. 
As noted by Johnson (1998), the demand for cement in Indonesia’s major cities was 
substantially reduced in early 1998. The contraction in the finance sector largely 
reflected the difficulties faced by the banks. As shown by the figures, the contraction 
in this sector was largely explained by the bank, rather than the non-bank, financial 
sectors. Manufacturing, particularly non-oil and gas, contracted at about the economy-
wide average.  
 
Table 2.1  GDP growth by broad sectors of economy (%), 1996-2003 
 
Sectors 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Agriculture 3.1 1.0 -1.3 2.2 1.9 1.7 2.0 2.5
Mining & Quarrying 6.3 2.1 -2.8 -1.6 5.5 1.3 2.5 0.5
Manufacturing Industries 11.6 5.3 -11.4 3.9 6.0 3.1 3.4 3.5
     Oil & Gas 11.1 -2.0 3.7 6.8 -1.7 -3.5 1.2 0.6
     Non-oil & Gas 11.7 6.1 -13.1 3.5 7.0 3.9 3.7 3.8
Electricity, Gas & Water Supply 13.6 12.4 3.0 8.3 7.6 8.2 6.0 6.8
Construction 12.8 7.4 -36.4 -1.9 5.6 4.4 4.9 6.7
Trade, Hotel & Restaurant 8.2 5.8 -18.2 -0.1 5.7 3.7 3.8 3.7
Transport & Communication 8.7 7.0 -15.1 -0.8 8.6 7.8 8.0 10.7
Finance 6.0 5.9 -26.6 -7.2 4.6 5.4 5.7 6.3
    Bank 3.0 5.1 -37.9 -13.6 5.5 6.8 6.4 6.2
    Other non-bank financial sectors 10.4 8.5 -17.2 1.8 3.9 4.8 4.2 4.4
Services 3.4 3.6 -3.8 1.9 2.3 3.1 2.1 3.4
    Public Administration 1.3 1.2 -7.3 1.7 1.4 1.1 0.4 0.9
    Private Services 7.4 7.9 1.9 2.4 3.8 6.2 4.5 6.8
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth 7.82 4.70 -13.13 0.79 4.92 3.45 3.69 4.10
Source: National Income Statistics  
 
Turning to the early recovery period (1999-2000), much of the large variation 
and patterns recorded in 1998 persisted into the following year. Bank-financial and 
construction sectors contracted further, by 15 and 1.9 per cent respectively.   
Meanwhile, non-oil and gas manufacturing seemed to begin recovering as it grew by 
3.5 per cent.  
 
As noted, however, the sign of recovery appeared unstable. Excluding finance 
and services sector, and to some extent agriculture sector, the growth declined in the 
following year until 2003. The table shows that manufacturing experienced a rather 
large downfall, from about 5 per cent in 2000 to a rather flat rate of growth of 3 per 
cent over the period 2001-03.   4
2.1.2 Monetary  indicators 
To get a picture of the performance of monetary indicators, it is useful to 
examine the trend of money supply, inflation and interest rates over the period 1997-
2003/04. Money supply is represented by base money (M0), inflation is computed 
using the consumer price index (CPI) and the interest rates are represented by one-
month Bank Indonesia Certificate (SBI) and the three-month time deposit.  The trends 
are given in Figures 2.2 and 2.3.   
 
Figure 2.2  Inflation (%, year-on-year) and base money (M0) (indexed at Jan 
























































































Inflation (CPI) Base Money (M0)
Source: BPS and Bank Indonesia
 
 











































One-month Bank Indonesia Certificates (SBI)  Three-month Time Deposit 
Source: Bank Indonesia
 
Money supply continued to increase from the onset of the crisis (Figure 2.2). 
The jumps in January and May 1998 were during a time of a mounting crisis of 
confidence characterised by bank runs. The runs forced BI to inject liquidity support   5
to prevent the banking system from collapse. As a result, base money increased by 
about 60 per cent in the first six months of 1998. BI finally managed to control the 
base money growth from August.   
 
Figure 2.2 shows that the impact of the crisis on inflation was dramatic. 
Inflation began to increase in the second half of 1997 when the crisis had just started, 
but it rose rapidly in since January 1998 and reached 82 per cent in September. A 
number of factors simultaneously contributed to the sudden increase. The sharp 
exchange rate increased the price of imported goods and the drought in early 1998 
contributed to substantial increases in food prices. The excessive monetary expansion 
also contributed to high inflation. In fact, the figure shows that inflation moved 
closely with base money, albeit with a lag and it thus confirms the conventional 
inflation theory.  
 
Interest rates increased substantially in September 1997 in response to the 
rapid exchange rate depreciation. The September one-month SBI rate doubled from 
about 11 per cent in July. Similarly, the three-month time deposit rates rose from 16 
per cent in July to 26 per cent in September. The rates had been declining since then, 
but this was occurred the period of high inflation. As a result, real interest rates were 
negative, which consequently caused a strong disincentive to hold the Rupiah. SBI 
rates had been increased dramatically since September 1997 and reached a peak of 
about 71 per cent in July 1998. The rising trend was followed by a similar trend in 
time deposits although the increase was not as dramatic as that seen in SBI rates. 
Interest rates began to decline in September after BI regained control over the base 
money growth, and almost reached the pre-crisis level at the end of 1999.   
 
The central bank appeared to continue the momentum it had in 1999 to further 
control the inflation. The base money kept increasing at about the same rate of growth 
over the period 2000-03 (see Figure 2.2). As shown in the figure, this strategy seemed 
to have been successful. Inflation peaked in January 2002 and started to decline, 
reaching to the pre-crisis level of below ten per cent in December 2003. The decline 
in inflation also helped the interest rate to move down (see Figure 2.3). At the end of 
2004, the interest rates were about half of their level in early 2002.   
2.1.3  Exchange rate and export performance 
The crisis severely affected the exchange rate. By 1999, the exchange rate had 
lost about 70 per cent of its nominal value from 1996 (See Figure 2.4). The excessive 
monetary expansion in 1998 played a major role in this sharp depreciation. The 
nominal depreciation was translated into a sharp real depreciation in 1998 and hence 
boosted Indonesia’s competitiveness. The improved competitiveness, however, did 
not last long as the nominal appreciation took place in 1999 and 2000.  
 
Despite the nominal appreciation, the sharp depreciation still helped to 
improve Indonesia’s competitiveness. Figure 2.5 indeed shows this. The Rupiah real 
effective exchange rate (REER) was about ten per cent more competitive than the 
other crisis-affected countries’ REER over the period 1999-2001. The Rupiah REER 
was only to be comparable to the other countries’ REER during the period 2001-04.  
 
The significantly higher competitiveness of Indonesian real exchange rate to 
the other crisis-affected countries’ real exchange rate seemed to have last only until   6
2002 (Figure 2.5). The Rupiah REER was about the same with that of Malaysia and 
Thailand over the period 2003-04. The Philippines even was more competitive than 
Indonesia and the other countries over this period. Even so, the Rupiah real exchange 
rate was still about 15 per cent more competitive than the rate before the crisis. 
 
Figure 2.4  Nominal exchange rate movements of several crisis-affected countries 
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Source: CEIC data base
 
 
Figure 2.5  Real exchange rate movements of several crisis-affected countries 
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Exchange rate depreciation is expected to improve export performance of the 
countries affected by the crisis. However, several studies (e.g. World Bank 2000; 
Duttagupta and Spilimbergo 2004) have demonstrated that the evidence conflicted 
with this prediction. As shown in Table 2.2, export growth in terms of the value of all 
crisis-affected countries contracted adversely in 1998, ranging from 4 per cent in 
Indonesia to nearly 16 per cent in the Philippines. This sluggish export supply 
response played a role in prolonging the crisis in these countries, and more   7




Table 2.2  Trends in export of East Asian countries, 1991-98. 
 
a. By export value
Country 1991-95 1996-98 1995 1996 1997 1998
Indonesia 12.3 2.9 14.3 10.4 2.4 -4.1
Malaysia 20.7 0.6 25.8 9.6 1.6 -9.3
Thailand 19.3 -1.9 25.3 1.5 1.6 -8.9
Philippines 17.4 3.0 24.3 15.5 9.1 -15.7
Korea 15.2 2.2 31.6 4.0 7.5 -5.0
World 8.2 2.3 18.6 5.0 3.9 -1.9
b. By export volume
Country 1991-95 1996-98 1995 1996 1997 1998
Indonesia 11.1 6.2 7.9 8.2 7.8 2.5
Malaysia 15.5 6.7 17.6 7.2 10.8 2
Thailand 14.3 2.9 15.5 -1.8 6.6 3.9
Philippines 9.5 12.6 12 8.6 20.9 8.3
Korea 14.9 16.6 24 13 23.6 13.3
World 6.7 6.9 8.9 6.1 10.3 4.3






Table 2.2 describe in more detail the sluggish export supply response for 
Indonesian manufacturing exports. The average export growth of Indonesian 
manufacturing was only 7 per cent during the crisis period (1997-2000), which was 
way below the pre-crisis average growth of 12 per cent despite the sharp real 
exchange rate depreciation over this period (see Figure 2.5). The some appreciation in 
the real Rupiah exchange rate appeared to further deteriorate the export performance. 
The average export growth declined even further to about 1 per cent over the 2000-04 
period, from already very low of 7 per cent on average during the crisis period. 
 
While disappointing, there was a large variation in the export performance 
across the broad sectors within the manufacturing sector. The rest of Table 2.2 points 
this out. At the extreme, three sectors, namely basic metal, food-and-beverages, and 
motor vehicle increased their exports between the crisis and post-crisis period.   
 
In contrast to this positive performance was the very disappointing 
performance of some sectors which Indonesia has its comparative advantage, and 
many of these had actually been the Indonesian export-oriented industries (labour- 
and resource-intensive industries). Sectors included in this group were furniture, 
paper-and-paper products, textiles, wearing apparel, and wood-and-wood products. 
   8
Table 2.2  Growth of Indonesian manufacturing exports (%), 1991-2004 
 
   Average Pre-crisis  Average Crisis 
Average Post-
crisis 
   (1991-96)  (1997-2000)  (2000-04) 
Total export  12.0  7.0  1.1 
Basic metals  5.4  14.1  17.5 
Chemicals   21.0  14.8  6.6 
Electricity machinery  50.0  21.3  7.3 
Fabricated metal products  26.2  9.7  -1.7 
Food  and  beverages  15.8 3.2 18.2 
Furniture 31.9  5.6  0.7 
Machinery and equipment  47.7  24.0  7.8 
Motor  vehicle  54.0 16.2 28.0 
Non-metallic metal  11.2  26.3  2.9 
Other transport equipment  34.1  7.9  3.7 
Paper and paper products  40.3  23.7  -1.3 
Consumer electronics  70.4  30.9  -1.9 
Rubber  and  plastic  29.9 14.9 11.6 
Textiles 16.2  6.7  -2.4 
Tobacco products  18.2  4.3  3.8 
Wearing apparel  14.8  9.5  -1.5 
Wood and wood products  8.2  -5.3  -2.5 
Publishing and printing  24.8  21.4  1.6 
Tanning and dressing of leather  25.0  -1.9  -5.4 
 
2.2  The impact of sharp exchange rate depreciation 
 
The usual argument for the impact of exchange rate depreciation on firms 
relates to potential change in their competitiveness. For firms producing tradable 
goods, sharp exchange rate depreciation can benefit local firms by raising import 
prices. This causes consumers to substitute towards domestically-produced goods and, 
by lowering production costs relative to firms in other countries, provides cost 
advantages in export markets (Desai et al. 2004). The cost advantages are derived 
from the decline in the relative costs of labour faced by firms in the country 
depreciating its exchange rate (Forbes 2002a). Several studies, in particular Forbes 
(2002a, 2002b), provide evidence that exchange rate depreciation improves the 
performance of firms that produce tradables. More generally, Ghei and Pritchett 
(1999) summarise the empirical evidence on the impact of exchange rate 
depreciations on exports, and conclude that exchange rate depreciations mostly 
translated to an improved export performance.  
 
Despite this evidence, some factors might mitigate the impact of improvement 
in competitiveness. The first is competitive depreciation, which means that the 
expansionary effect of exchange rate depreciation in a country (through exports) may 
not materialise if the trade competitors of the country also undertake similar 
depreciation.
1 The second is a period of high inflation during the crisis, which limits 
                                                 
1 Competitive depreciation has long been recognised as a major constraint on export expansion (Gupta 
et al. 2003).   9
the extent to which the nominal exchange rate depreciation translates into a real 
depreciation. 
 
The third factor is firms’ production structure. As shown in the theoretical 
framework developed by Forbes (2002a), the short-run benefit of exchange rate 
depreciation on a firm’s production costs (i.e. lowered relative labour costs) depends 
on the share of imported input used in production. If the share is large, exchange rate 
depreciation increases the costs of capital and thereby weakens the positive impact of 
lower production costs from the cheaper labour.  
 
The last factor involves exchange rate depreciation and firms’ financial 
constraints, working through ‘the balance sheet channel’. If a large share of firm debt 
is denominated in foreign currency, exchange rate depreciation may diminish their net 
worth by inflating the domestic-currency value of the debt, and hence lowering the 
firms’ ability to increase investment. The negative impact of the depreciation on the 
firms’ financial constraints, however, is less likely to affect export-oriented 




2.3 ‘Self-selection’  hypothesis and sunk-cost in exporting 
 
Exchange rate depreciation increases firms’ incentive to export. Whether the 
advantage can be captured, however, depends on some other factors. Literature on 
exporting suggests that firm efficiency is one such factor. The argument, which is 
often termed as the ‘self-selection hypothesis’, is based on the notion that export 
markets are far more competitive than domestic firms, which allow only the most 
productive firms to survive (Aw and Hwang 1995).  
 
Many empirical studies have established support for this hypothesis. In 
particular, productivity is found to be significantly different between exporters and 
non-exporters (e.g. Bernard and Jensen 1999). For Indonesian manufacturing, 
Sjoholm and Takii (2003) observed that exporting plants are larger and more 
productive. They found that labour productivity of these plants was about twice as 
high as non-exporting plants and this difference seems to have increased over time 
during the 1990s.  
 
Differences between exporters and non-exporters, however, are not only 
limited to productivity. Several other studies have also found significant differences in 
terms of the other characteristics, including size, ownership and capital intensity. For 
example, Bernard et al. (1995) and Bernard and Jensen (1999) documented that 
exporters in US manufacturing are larger, more productive, more capital intensive, 
pay higher wages, and employ more skilled workers. A similar finding was also 
observed for developing countries (e.g. Aw and Hwang 1995; Berry 1992). 
 
                                                 
2 For Mexican firms in the 1990s, this was in fact the case. Firms which borrowed abroad were largely 
exporters (Aguiar 2005; Krueger and Tornell 1999). A similar characteristic was also evident for firms 
in the South East Asian countries. The World Bank’s firm-level survey in 1998 revealed that firms in 
these countries which borrowed abroad were mostly exporters, foreign and large firms (Kawai et al. 
2000).    10
The presumption underlies the ‘self-selection’ hypothesis is that there are 
additional costs involved in participating in export markets. These costs, which 
usually involve high fixed costs, include transport costs and expenses related to 
establishing distributional channels and production costs in adapting products for 
foreign tastes (Bernard and Jensen 1999). 
 
The presumption has an important implication. That is, it produces persistence 
in export participation. Once a firm decides to service an export market in a period of 
time, it tends to stay an exporter in the next period of time. To illustrate this, a variant 
model of decision to export with sunk entry-costs, first developed by Roberts and 
Tybout (1997) is presented below, borrowing from Campa (2004).
3 The expected 
profits of a rational, profit-maximising firm i at time t,  ˆit π , are given by 
 
() 1 ˆ ,( 1 ) it it it t t it it YX Z N Y ππ − ⎡⎤ =− − ⎣⎦          ( 2 . 1 )  
 
where  it π  is gross profit from exporting, which is not adjusted for entry costs and 
depends on  t X  and  it Z , which denote exogenous factors that affect profitability (e.g. 
exchange rate) and firm-specific factors, respectively.  it N  is the entry cost faced by 
the firm and  it Y  is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm exports in t 
and 0 otherwise. The value of  ˆit π  depends on whether the firm exported or not in the 
previous year (i.e. whether  1 1 it Y − =  or  1 0 it Y − = ). If the firm exported in the previous 
year,  ˆit it π π = , but if the firm did not export in the previous year, it must pay entry 
cost,  ˆit it it N π π =−.
4 
 
The firm is assumed to plan the sequence of its export participation to maximise 
expected current and discounted future profits net of entry costs, 
 
ˆ () m a x | ()
st








⎝⎠ ∑        ( 2 . 2 )  
 
where  t E  is an expectation operator conditioned on the set of information at time t 
( it Ω ) and δ  is a time discount rate. Firm i chooses the current value of  it Y  that 
satisfies the Bellman’s equation : 
 
[ ] () 11 ˆ () m a x ( ) | it it it t it it it VE V Y πδ ++ Ω= + Ω       ( 2 . 3 )  
 
Solving the first-order condition of 2.3, firm i will decide to export when 
 
() [ ] [ ] 11 11 ,1 ( ) | 1 1 ( ) | 0 it t t t it it it t it it it XZ EV Y EV Y πδ ++ ++ ⎡⎤ + + Ω= −+ Ω= ⎣⎦  
1 (1 ) it it NY − ≥−           ( 2 . 4 )  
 
                                                 
3 This model is similar to that of Bernard and Wagner (1998) regarding the specification of entry costs. 
4 In Roberts and Tybout (1997), the entry costs are allowed to be the function of exporting history.   11
From equation 2.4, it is clear how the sunk entry-costs produce persistence in 
export participation. Positive sunk entry costs (i.e.  0 it N > ) implies that the decision 
to export is dependent on time. This can clearly be seen by supposing there are no 
sunk entry-costs (i.e.  0 it N = ) which collapses equation 2.4 to  () ,0 it t t XZ π ≥  and 
leaves the decision to export as a purely static process (i.e. independent of time). 
 
The role of sunk costs in affecting a firm’s decision to export has been another 
important topic in the empirical literature. While there has not been much study on 
this topic, a few studies do agree that sunk costs are a large and significant source of 
persistence in exporting. For example, Roberts and Tybout (1997) found that 
exporting experience in the previous year had a strong and positive effect in 
determining export participation in the current year for plants in Colombian 
manufacturing. Similar findings can also be observed in Campa (2004) and Bernard 
and Jensen (2004) for Spain and US manufacturing plants, respectively.  
 
2.3  Some possible explanations from the Asian crisis literature on the 
sluggish export performance during and after the crisis  
 
Several possible explanations for the sluggish export response have been 
popularised in the Asian crisis literature. The most common is the decline in demand 
for exports during the few years before the crisis. Reflecting this, Table 2.1 shows the 
substantial decline in export growth in 1996 and 1997 across all countries affected by 
the crisis. Decomposing the source of export growth in the period 1995-96, ADB 
(2002) revealed that 86 per cent of decline can be attributed to a weakening export 
demand. Several factors underlie the weakened demand. First, these countries 
specialised in trading among themselves. According to World Bank (2000), intra-
regional exports accounted for about 40 per cent of East Asia’s total exports. 
Therefore, when a region-wide export shock hits, as occurred in 1995 and 1996, these 
countries are likely to experience some decline in their exports because they are not 
able to diversify their exports to other markets. In addition to the high trade intensity 
within the region, many product sectors in which these countries specialised, such as 
textiles, garments and footwear, experienced a slump in 1995 and 1996 (World Bank 
2000; ADB 2002). Finally, the depreciation of the Japanese yen against the US dollar 
contributed to lower price-competitiveness of these countries’ exports, since their 
currencies were effectively pegged to the US dollar. The effect of weakened export 
demand was mostly manifested through the decline in prices, instead of volume. 
According to the ADB (2002), about two-thirds of the decline in export value (in US 
dollars) was due to a decline in export prices (also in US dollar terms).   
 
The other explanations for the sluggish export response during the crisis 
include the contraction in credit to private sectors (credit crunch hypothesis) and, as 
noted in Section 2.1, the impact of competitive depreciation. That is, the export 
decline in a country which experienced sharp exchange rate depreciation during the 
crisis might have been due to currency depreciation by its competitors. Duttagupta 
and Spilimbergo (2004) tested these explanations by estimating the short- and long-
run export demand and supply equations of several Asian countries (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong). Their results provide only 
weak support for the credit-crunch hypothesis, primarily because there was mixed 
evidence about the relationship between the domestic credit variable and export   12
supply price. In addition to this, they found a relatively quick adjustment in export 
supply, ranging between 1.5 and 2 years. As one would expect, the adjustment would 
have been longer than what was found if the credit-crunch hypothesis was true.  
 
Duttagupta and Spilimbergo’s findings on the credit-crunch hypothesis are 
consistent with findings in other studies (Dwor-Frecaut et al. 2000; Gosh and Gosh 
1999; Krueger and Tornell 1999). Drawing on the Mexican currency and banking 
crisis in 1994, Krueger and Tornell showed that firms in tradable sectors were not 
significantly affected by of credit crunch. They attributed the success of exporting 
firms in the tradable sector to the fact that, since the early 1990s, most of these firms 
had been able to obtain trade financing from the international capital market.  
 
Duttagupta and Spilimbergo provide some evidence supporting the 
competitive devaluation explanation. From the supply side, they found that nominal 
depreciation resulted in lower export prices, suggesting that exchange rate 
depreciation should increase the export demand in a country. However, from the 
demand side they found that the export demand elasticity with respect to competitors’ 
price was positive and large. Thus, export demand in a country would be reduced 
substantially if the country’s export competitors also reduced their export price. 
 
Empirical studies examining how firms or exporters responded to an economic 
crisis have been sparse, but two are worth reviewing – Blomstrom and Lipsey (1993) 
and Lipsey (2001). Both examine the export response of US affiliates in some Latin  
America countries to the 1980’s debt crisis. Lipsey (2001) extended the analysis in the 
context of the Asian 1997/98 crisis.   
 
The studies focus on the role of foreign ownership as an important determinant 
in a successful response to the crises. They argue that it is easier for multinationals to 
redirect sales from domestic to export markets (Blomstrom and Lipsey 1993, p.109). 
The capacity to switch from domestic to external markets, being well connected to the 
latter through global distribution channels and better knowledge than local firms in 
terms of international marketing skills, are the reasons behind the argument.  
 
Blomstrom and Lipsey showed that both export growth and the propensity of 
US affiliates in some Latin American countries increased dramatically during the 
1980’s crisis. However, they noted that these increases could partly be attributed to 
the decrease in domestic sales rather than an increase in production. Any increase 
from production is suggested to have happened over a longer time period after the 
crisis. 
 
Lipsey (2001) shows that exports of US and Japanese affiliates increased at a 
higher rate than the rate of the total host countries’ export in 1997 and 1998, resulting 
in an increase in the affiliates’ share in the countries’ exports.
5 Providing more 
evidence on sales redirection, Lipsey shows the ratio of exports to total sales of US 
manufacturing affiliates in East Asia increased significantly in 1998. For the crisis-
affected countries, the largest change is observed for Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Between 1997 and 1998, the ratio increased from 17 to 32 per cent for Indonesia and 
from 68 to 85 per cent for Malaysia.  
                                                 
5 The figure for Japanese manufacturing was limited only until 1997.    13
 
More generally for the case of Indonesia, there were additional factors 
contributing to the sluggish export response. First, the social and political instability 
in 1998 caused international buyers to cancel export orders and shift to other 
countries. Rosner (2000) provides some support for this. He shows that exports of 
manufactured goods declined sharply during the second half of 1998 and, more 
importantly, his interviews with several textile, garment and footwear manufacturers 
confirmed that many companies suffered severe cutbacks in orders after the 1998 
riots. The second factor causing the poor export performance was the rejection of 
Indonesian letters of credit from the beginning of 1998, which severely affected 
imports of some crucial products (Johnson 1998). The fall in imports would have been 
expected to affect the export performance of manufacturers who use a great deal of 
imported intermediate inputs or raw materials in their production. Finally, the poor 
export performance was also caused by the shortage of containers (Johnson 1998), 
since the collapse of imports greatly reduced the number of containers entering the 
country. 
 
Similar to the picture during the peak of the crisis, only little is know about the 
sluggish export performance in a few years after the crisis. Despite this, few studies 
(e.g. James et al. 2003; Aswicahyono et al. 2004; Aswicahyono and Hill 2004) 
speculated several possible explanations. The first is the deteriorating infrastructure 
and export/import facilities. The deterioration is argued to have significantly lowered 
the competitiveness of Indonesian exporters vis-à-vis exporters in other countries. For 
example, Ray (2003) documented that the cost of lifting containers in Tanjung Priok, 
one of the major ports in Indonesia, is the highest among the other eights major port in 
Asia. In addition, the export/import procedure in the country has been significantly 
more costly, cumbersome and unpredictable (Aswicahyono et al. 2004). It was 
reported that garment exporters take about 7 to 10 days to get consignments from 
factory to ship. 
 
The other possible explanation is the decline in competitiveness of Indonesian 
exporters, due to the rising labour cost and deteriorating investment climate. The 
former is related to the mandated minimum wage and dismissal procedure. In 2001 
the government introduced a law that increases the severance rates between 19 to 63 
per cent. According to Aswicahyono et al. (2004), Indonesia’s dismissal regulations 
were among the most costly in East Asia. As noted in James et al. (2003), the rising 
labour cost severely impacted firms in labour-intensive industry. That is, a 20 per cent 
increase in the cost in apparel industry would lead to about 4 per cent increase in total 
cost. As for the investment climate, few (e.g. Thee 2003) have reported that Indonesia 
has been an unattractive location for foreign direct investment (FDI). Business 
communities from Indonesia’s major export destination countries, such as Japan and 
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III. Data and methodology 
This study attempts to answer the research questions by way of statistical 
analysis and case study. Before detailing the method for the empirical analysis, it is 
important to firstly present the description of the data used in the statistical analysis. 
 
3.1  Data 
 
The main data set for the quantitative analysis is the annual manufacturing 
surveys of medium- and large-scale establishments (Statistik Industry, or SI), from 
1993 to 2004.
6 The period covers the pre-crisis (1993-96), peak crisis (1997-99), early 
recovery (1999-2001), and the recovery (2001-04). The establishments are defined as 
those with 20 or more employees. The surveys are undertaken by the Indonesian 
Central Board of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik or BPS) and, as noted in many 
studies, the SI data are considered one of the best by the standard of developing 
countries. They cover a wide range of information on the establishments, including 
some basic information (ISIC classification, year of starting production, location), 
ownership (share of foreign, domestic and government), production (gross output, 
stocks, capacity utilisation, share of output exported), material costs and various type 
of expenses, labour (head-count and salary and wages), capital stock and investment, 
and sources of investment funds. 
 
The data, however, have several limitations. First, they do not include 
information which can identify whether an establishment is a single-unit or a part of a 
multi-plant firm. As a result, establishments owned by an enterprise can not be linked 
up, and hence the number of enterprises is over-numerated: some plants may have 
been counted as firms whereas in practice they are not. Unfortunately, the extent of 
the over-numeration is unknown. Nevertheless, there are two reasons which suggest it 
might not have been large. First, a separate BPS publication that lists the surveyed 
firms reveals that the number of multi-plant firms is not large, i.e. about 500 to 1,000 
firms out of more than 15,000 firms surveyed each year by BPS in the early 2000s.
7 
Second, each plant might be run as an independent business, as plants owned by a 
multi-plant firm are not necessarily interconnected. However, this is likely to occur if 
each of the plants produces different goods.  
 
The other limitation is that the surveys produce only annual data. In the study 
on firm behaviour, the ideal situation is to have high-frequency data, either monthly or 
quarterly, because firms’ adjustment could happen within a short period of time.  
 
Finally, a few variables relevant to this study are not available. For example, 
the variable that identifies whether or not plants are owned by business groups 
(conglomerates) is not available. Being part of a business group might be important in 
shaping the firm’s response because the group might support the financially-distressed 
firms during the peak of the crisis, owing to its business operation in diverse markets.  
 
                                                 
6 Obviously it would be useful to have the most recent year (i.e. 2005). At the time when the research 
proposal for this study was made, however, the latest year of available data is 2004 (this information 
was acquired from a communication between Mr Narjoko and a BPS official). 
7 This information was provided by Dr. Sadayuki Takii.   15
It is important to make a clarification here related to the unit of observation. 
That is, throughout this study, the terms of ‘firm’, ‘company’ and ‘plant’ are used 
interchangeably. In principle, the unit of observation of interest is firm (company), 
but, because of the data limitations, plant is used as the unit of observation. In other 
words, a single plant is considered as a firm. While this assumption clearly has a 
limitation – as it does not acknowledge the existence the multi-plant firms – it is still 
reasonable to accept the assumption, for the two reasons outlined above. 
 
Table 3.1 provides some descriptive statistics computed from the data. The 
statistics indicate that most of the plants are medium plants, defined here by number 
of employees. This is clearly seen from the median of the data, which ranges from 45 
to 60 employees over the three years considered in the table. The statistics on the 
number of employees also inform us that the distribution is very-skewed one – and it 
is skewed to the left – indicating that there are relatively only few very large plants in 
the data. A similar picture can be derived from the statistics of the amount of sales, 
where one of the aspects is the very high variation across the plants. The amount of 
sales increases by more than 2,000 per cent when another 50 per cent of plant 
population is included in the distribution, i.e., from 25 to 75 percentile. 
 
Table 3.1  Some descriptive statistics of the SI data, 1995, 2000, and 2003 
 
   1995  2000  2003 
Size (number of employees)          
   Mean  245.2  246.2  210.3 
   Median  58  55  48 
   Percentiles:          
      5%  22  21  21 
      25%  30  28  26 
      75%  180  177  145 
      95%  988  1036  861 
           
Sales (thousand of Rupiah)          
   Mean  12,100,000  35,900,000  39,400,000 
   Median  660,246  1,320,125  1,935,240 
   Percentiles:          
      5%  54,057  103,331  140,000 
      25%  187,854  382,715  539,606 
      75%  3,963,223  9,023,527  12,000,000 
      95%  47,500,000  127,000,000  150,000,000 
           
Percentage of exported sales          
   Mean  68.5  74.7  n.a. 
   Median  80.0  90.0  n.a. 
   Percentiles:          
      5%  6.0  10.0  n.a. 
      25%  41.0  50.0  n.a. 
      75%  100.0  100.0  n.a. 
      95%  100.0  100.0  n.a. 
           
Distribution of plant by status of ownership (%)          
    Foreign  2.8  7.4  5.7 
    Domestic  95.2  89.6  92.1   16
    Government  2.0  3.0  2.2 
Notes: 1. The statistics computed for the percentage of exported sales were done   
                 only for a subset of exporting plants.       
             2. Definition of the status of ownership:       
                 a. Foreign if the plant has any positive share of foreign ownership.   
                 b. Domestic private if the plant has 100 % of private ownership.    
                 c. Government if the plant has a positive private ownership share, but not 100%,  
                     and a positive government ownership share.    
 
Regarding exporting behaviour, the statistics suggest that most of exporting 
plants in the data base export-oriented plants. The median for the percentage exported 
sales is very high, i.e., 80 or 90 per cent. In addition, even when only 25 per cent of 
plants in the distribution is considered, i.e. the 25 percentile, the percentage exported 
sales is already reaches a large number, which is about 40 per cent or more. 
 
Turning to the distribution of plants by its ownership characteristics, the 
statistics indicate that almost all plants in the distribution are domestic-private plants. 
Despite this, a more interesting inference perhaps is derived from examining the 
statistics over time. It is shown that the proportion of foreign plants had actually been 
actually increasing over the period 1993 to 2003, or over the ten years period. While 
this could only be a random change in the distribution over the time, the authors 
predict that this could be due to some structural change as a result of the crisis. 
 
In addition to the SI data, other information is used for adjusting the data base 
and constructing the variables, with the following detail: 
 
•  Concordance Tables between ISIC (International Standard Industrial 
Classification) Revision 2 and 3, provided by BPS (BPS 2000). 
•  Wholesale Price Index (WPI) data at two- and three-digit industry level, provided 
by BPS.  
 
Oil and gas refining sectors (ISIC 353 and 354) are excluded. They were only 
included in the survey in the 1990s and, by comparing their aggregate figures between 
SI and other data sources (i.e. National Income Statistics published by BPS), it is clear 
that the data are still weak. 
 
By matching the plants according to the plant-code variable (PSID), two 
periods of plant-level panel are constructed: Period 1 (1994-2000) and Period 2 
(2002-04). The division, while is not desirable, is unavoidable. This is because there 
seems to have been a systematic error in the data entry for PSID variable in the survey 
year of 2001. Data examination done by the authors found a sudden jump in the firm 
entry and exit rates in the industry for 2001. Based on the authors’ prior knowledge on 
the industry’s firm entry and exit rates, the sudden jump is likely the result of data-
entry breakdown, rather than an actual change of firm behaviour. Further data 
examination suggested the extent of mistakes in the PSID data entry for the period 
1994-2000 and 2000-02 is low, and thus motivated the study to divide the panel data 
period.    17
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Statistical  analysis 
Two aspects of export-supply response are addressed in this study: the change 
in export participation and export intensity. These aspects are motivated by the fact 
that any aggregate change in export performance (i.e. at country- or industry-level) is 
a result from two different, but related, firm behaviours. First, existing exporters can 
increase or decrease their exported output. They may increase by redirecting output to 
foreign markets or by expanding exports. Included in this mechanism are exporters 
that switch from exporting to non-exporting. The second behaviour is where non-
exporters that have been domestically oriented switch to participate in foreign 
markets. The second mechanism can also be achieved by new firms entering the 
industry.  
 
a.  Descriptive analysis 
 
The statistical analysis is divided into two parts: descriptive and econometric 
analysis. The descriptive analysis aims to gauge the picture of export supply response 
of firms in Indonesian manufacturing during and after the crisis. In principle, it 
constructs and analyses some transition matrices that describe the movement in 
exporting status and class of exporters (i.e. low, moderately or highly intensive 
exporters) of the continuously operating and exporting plants, respectively, over the 
period 1994-2004.  
 
The descriptive analysis is extended to examine the role of foreign ownership. 
The matrices are reconstructed, dividing the groups of plants according to their 
ownership status. This study follows the approach by the other studies, in particular 
Narjoko (2006), in categorising the plants. In particular, three dummy variables were 
created for every plant plant i: domestic-private ( i DPRI ), foreign ( i DFOR ) and 
state-owned plants ( i DGOV ).  i DPRI  and  i DFOR  are defined as 
 
        1 =  if the share of domestic-private  ownership  in     
i DPRI              plant i is equal to 100 per cent 
        0 =  otherwise. 
 
        1 =  if  0 i FOR >   p e r   c e n t         
i DFOR           
        0 =  otherwise. 
 
Three joint venture groups of plants, which are foreign-government, foreign-
domestic and foreign-government-domestic, are considered foreign plants 
(i.e. 1 i DFOR = ). This consideration is based on previous empirical studies which 
suggest the share of foreign ownership does not necessarily reflect the extent of 
control. According to Aswicahyono and Hill (1995), many Indonesian case studies   18
have demonstrated that local partners often play a relatively minor role even when 
they hold the majority of equity. This is particularly true for matters related to finance 
and technology. Moreover, Ramstetter (1999) demonstrated that one important role of 
foreign ownership is to widen a firm’s access to international market. For plants in 
Indonesian manufacturing, he showed the propensity to export was even higher for 
plants with a low foreign ownership share (10 to 50 per cent), compared to that for the 
domestic plants. 
 
The other groups of plants not considered are state-owned plants and the group 
of government-domestic private. Following a similar argument as for  i DFOR , the 
government-domestic group is classified as ‘government’ and hence,  i DGOV  is 





        1 =  if  0 i GOV > p e r   c e n t         
i DGOV           
        0 =  otherwise. 
 
b.  The estimating equations 
 
The empirical models for econometric analysis are given as the following, in 
their general form: 
 
t i t i t i X EP , , 1 0 , ' ε α α + + =         ( 3 . 1 )  
 
t i t i
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−      (3.2) 
 
where equation 3.1 and 3.2 are export participation and export propensity adjustment 
equations, respectively. i represent plant i,  t represents the years for the period 
1997-2004.  t i EP,  is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the plant was 
exporting in year t and 0 otherwise.  t i EXPG ,  is the annual growth of a plant’s export 
intensity ( i EXP  ) in year t.  i EXP  is defined as the ratio of exports to total output.  i X  
is set of explanatory variables capturing the plant characteristics. Year and industry 
dummy variables are included to control for differences across years, industries and 
region, respectively.  
 
The models are estimated within the panel-data framework. The estimation 
uses the fixed-effect method, and therefore, the effect of unobserved factors should be 
taken into account. The decision to adopt fixed-effect method – rather than random-  19
effect method – was motivated by the argument that the unobserved factors are firm-
specific, including, for example, management capability and method of production.
8 
 
Equation 3.1 is estimated within the framework of a binary choice model (i.e. 
probit or logit), instead of a linear probability model (LPM). This is mainly because 
the predicted probability derived from LPM may lie outside the 0-1 region, which is 
clearly not reasonable in practice.
9  
 
To facilitate hypothesis testing and organise the empirical analysis, 
estimations were done in two steps. In the first step, equation 3.1 was estimated for 
the full sample, consisting of exporting and non-exporting plants. The emphasis here 
is on export participation response and the hypothesis testing on exporting history. In 
the second step, equation 3.2 was estimated only for the exporting sample. The 
emphasis here is on export propensity response.  
 
For the estimation in the first step, a more detailed empirical model can be 
rewritten as follows – with one of the independent variables is exporting history, or 
the previous year export participation ( 1 t EP− ) 
 
t i t i t i it X EP EP , , 2 1 , 1 0 ε α α α + + + = −       ( 3 . 3 )  
 
There is a potential endogeneity problem in estimating equation 3.3, with 
exporting history ( 1 t EP− ) being the endogenous variable.  1 t EP−  is likely endogenous 
because there is strong persistence in the variable correlates with  it ε . Previous studies 
(e.g. Roberts and Tybout 1997; Campa 2004) found a very strong effect from the 
previous years’ exporting status on the current decision to export. To correct for this 
problem, the instrumental variable approach was adopted.  
 
In this situation, two alternative estimation methods can be used: joint 
estimation and two-step procedure. The two-step procedure is more attractive because 
of its computational advantage. The equation for endogenous variable (as a function 
of the instrumental variables) is not estimated jointly with the equation of interest (i.e. 
equation 3.3), which computationally can be very complicated. Mimicking the 
standard 2SLS approach, the two-step procedure firstly estimates the endogenous 
variable, by LPM, before estimating equation 3.3 by the binary choice model. Despite 
the advantage, the two-step procedure often gives less consistent and efficient 
estimates than maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) estimates (Wooldridge 2002, 
p.476). For this reason, the equation was estimated using the joint estimation method.  
 
An important statistical issue regarding estimation of equation 3.2 is “sample 
censoring”. The dependent variables,  it EXPG , can only be calculated for pairs of 
                                                 
8 The unobserved factors are commonly known as  i α  in panel-data estimation literature (e.g. 
Wooldridge 2000). 
9 Despite this, a binary response model also has a number of shortcomings. One important one is that 
the potential for bias arising from neglected heterogeneity (i.e. omitted variables) is larger in a binary 
choice model than in a linear model. Wooldridge (2002) nevertheless pointed out that estimating a 
binary response model by a binary choice model still gives reliable estimates, particularly if the 
estimation purpose is to obtain the direction of the effect of explanatory variables.   20
plants that remained as exporters in t and  1 t − . Therefore, the sample is likely to be 
truncated, particularly during the peak of the crisis, and estimating equation 3.2 on the 
selected sample may lead to biased estimates. To guard from a potential of bias, 
Heckman’s (1976) two-step estimation method was used to correct this problem. In 
the first step, equation 3.1 is estimated using the probit model and the inverse Mills 
ratio is computed for every observation. In the second step, equation 3.2 was 
estimated on the selected sample, adding the computed inverse Mills ratio as another 
explanatory variable.   
3.2.2 Case  Study 
In the case study, this study adopts some in-depth interviews with firm senior-
level manager as the research method. While the interview results might be subjective 
– and therefore might be bias too –, this method is still appropriate to supplement the 
statistical analysis, considering the time and resource limitation. It is therefore 
important to bear in mind about this weakness when interpreting the results. 
 
Two industries are chosen to facilitate a comparison of extreme cases, namely 
textile and garment, and electronics industry. These industries were known to be two 
of important sectors in the Indonesian manufacturing industry. The former represents 
the traditional export-oriented industries while the latter represents the new export-
oriented industries. The approach, which is commonly known as multiple-case 
studies, is adopted for the reason that it provides a more robust results compared to 
the single-case study approach (Yin 1984).  
 
The interview aims to more gain insight into the extent of the firm export-
supply response to the more competitive exchange rate environment and factors that 
determine the firms’ response. Special attention is given to the factors that can not be 
represented by some variables extracted from the SI data base.  
 
The interview, in particular, asked the following topics: 
 
1.  The impact of the weakened exchange rate during and after the crisis on the 
company’s decision to export.  
 
2.  The extent of success of the firms in increasing their exports or in redirecting their 
sales orientation from domestic to export market. 
 
3.  The determinants of the export-supply response during and after the crisis. In 
particular, the study asks the importance and the mechanism of the following 
factors in determining the response: 
•  The difference in efficiency between exporters and non-exporters. 
•  Exporting history. 
•  Foreign ownership 
•  Access to trade and financial supports. 
•  Access to foreign markets. 
•  Export-supporting facilities and infrastructure. 
 
4.  The major issues that hinder export expansion in response to the more competitive 
exchange rate situation.    21
IV. Empirical results and analysis 
4. 1  The firm export-supply response during the period 1993-2004: a 
descriptive analysis  
 
Some descriptive tables are presented to assist the discussion, drawing from 
the data for the period 1993-2000 (Period 1) and 2002-04 (Period 2).
10 As noted, the 
data for 2001 were not included since there seems to have been a systematic error in 
the data-entry for plant-code variable.
11 
 
We start the analysis by examining the simple transition rates that describe the 
movement of plants in export market. These are given in Table 4.1. The time was 
divided into three sub periods: pre-crisis (1993-96), deep crisis (1997-99) and 
recovery (1999-2000 and 2002-04).
12   
 
Table 4.1  Transition rates of plants (%) in export market: 1993-2000 and 
2002-04. 
 
a.  Pre-crisis         
Year t status  Year t+1 status  1993-4  1994-5  1995-6  Average 1993-96 
No export  No export  93.5 94.3 92.2  93.3 
    Export  6.5 5.7 7.8  6.7 
Export  No  export  26.5 22.2 15.6  21.5 
    Export  73.5 77.8 84.4  78.5 
         
b.  Deep  crisis         
Year t status  Year t+1 status  1996-7  1997-8  1998-9  Average 1996-99 
No export  No export  95.5  100.0  85.0  93.5 
   Export  4.5  0.0  15.0  6.5 
Export  No  export  49.8 85.3 87.4  74.2 
    Export  50.2 14.7 12.6  25.8 
         
Recovery  period         
Year t status  Year t+1 status  1999-2000 2002-03  2003-04  Average 1999-2004 
No export  No export  94.1 92.6 92.4  93.0 
    Export  5.9 7.4 7.6  7.0 
Export  No  export  18.1 27.1 27.6  24.2 
    Export  81.9 72.9 72.4  75.8 
 
The transition rates presented in Table 4.1a clearly reflect the export-oriented 
industrialisation in Indonesia. The number of firms that become exporters are 
suggested to have been increasing over the period 1993-96, as well as the number of 
firms that stay at export markets. The latter strongly highlights the extent of export 
orientation. The transition rates for the plants that stay in exporting state increased by 
about 10 percentage points only within two years period. 
                                                 
10 Unless otherwise stated, the figures in the tables were computed by the authors from the data base. 
11 See Section 3.1. 
12 Here, we put together the early recovery (1999-2000) and recovery (2002-04) period to simplify the 
analysis.   22
 
The picture, however, changes dramatically during the deep crisis period. 
Table 4.1b reflects the severe impact of the crisis on the Indonesian economy. Unlike 
the figure for the pre-crisis period, the extent of plants that were out of export market 
was very high in this period, reaching about 75 per cent of the total exporters on 
average. There was, however, an interesting finding that despite the high exit rate, 
there were about 15 per cent of plants that switched to become exporters in 1999. It is 
worth noting here that this rate is about twice the rate in the pre-crisis period. It is thus 
shows a quick recovery of the exporting plants which, among other, could be 
attributed to the sudden increase in the competitiveness from the sharp exchange rate 
depreciations during this period. 
  
The early but quick recovery in 1999 seems to have continued in the following 
years. As shown in the Table 4.1c, the average of transition rates over the 1999-2004 
period was similar to the average rates of the pre-crisis period (1993-96).  
 
Based on this statistics, one thus could argue that the extent of export 
participation has recovered, and as noted, one factor fuelling the rapid recovery was 
the boost in competitiveness from exchange rate depreciation. A caveat, however, 
immediately applies. That is, while providing a similar statistics, the transition rates in 
the recovery period provide substantially different picture to that during the pre-crisis. 
In particular, the extent of export orientation seems to have been weakened after the 
crisis. The rate showing the plants that had become non-exporters in the recovery 
period, for example, increase substantially from 18 to about 28 per cent, in contrast to 
the rapid decline from 25.5 to 15.6 per cent over the 1993-96 period (i.e. pre-crisis). 
Given the depreciated real exchange rate, these statistics therefore do not really show 
a credible recovery. In contrast, it may have shown a disappointing and worrying 
outlook, because the statistics simply mean that some considerable amount of 
exporting plants actually had left the export markets.  
 
Table 4.1 also provides more insights into what had happened during the 
recovery period. It suggests a strong persistency of firms in either state of their status 
in export market (‘exporting’ or ‘non-exporting’). Accordingly, this might explain 
why the export did not respond to the improved terms of trade. This is shown 
particularly by the figures for pre-crisis and recovery period (Table 4.1a and c). The 
transition rates from non-exporting to exporting in these periods are about the same 
(i.e., about 7 per cent), implying almost 93 per cent of the non-exporters in these 
periods stayed as they were. The strong persistency is also shown for those that had 
operated in export market, that is, about 78 per cent of plants stayed as exporters in 
export markets in the two periods.  
 
Table 4.1 suggests the lack of export response to the improved terms of trade 
could be caused by the inability of the firms in immediately engaging in export 
activities. This suggestion is consistent and supports the ‘self-selection’ hypothesis, 
and in particular, the model of ‘sunk cost’ of exporting (Roberts and Tybout 1997).
13 
Thus, according to the theory, the lack of export response is not because firms were 
not attracted to the improved competitiveness, but simply because starting to export 
                                                 
13 See Section 2.2 for the more detailed discussion about the hypothesis.   23
(for those which had not been exporting earlier) or expanding export market (for those 
which had been exporting) is not necessarily cheap activities for firms.  
 
This proposition could imply that the non-exporter that switched to become 
exporters should have been the firms that seriously have prepared themselves to sell 
their product and compete in international market. The data support this proposition. 
Presenting the distribution of the new exporting plants in the period 1993-2000 by 
export intensity class, Table 4.2 shows about more than half of the new exporting 
plants were classified as plants with high export intensity (export intensity of greater 
than 0.5).
14 Moreover, the extent to which the switching firms are really serious in 
exporting seems to have been higher after the crisis. The distribution of the new 
exporting plants classified in the high export intensity class in 2000 (i.e., the recovery 
period) was about 10 percentage points higher than the distribution in the pre-crisis 
period.  
 
Table 4.2  Distribution of the new exporting plants (%) by export intensity 
class, 1993-2000. 
 
   Pre-crisis  Deep crisis  Recovery
                        Period 
   1994  1995  1996  Average  1997 1999  Average  2000 
Export intensity class:                
   Low  11.0  14.4  13.7  13.0  6.2 5.2  5.7 8.2 
   Medium  29.0  31.5  37.3  32.6  18.9 22.1  20.5 27.7 
   High  60.0  54.2  49.1  54.4  74.9 72.8  73.8 64.1 
Notes: 1. Export intensity is defined as the ratio of exports to output in plant i, or EXPi.      
            2. Definition of export intensity groups:           
                   Low: 0 < EXPi < 0.1            
                   Medium: 0.1 ≤ EXPi < 0.5           
                   High:  EXPi ≥ 0.5            
            3. The distribution is not available for 2003 since SI data do not provide      
                information for export propensity for the data published after 2000.       
 
The next two tables examine the behaviour of the existing exporters. The 
examination is important because an increase in aggregate export is a result of two 
different firm behaviours. In addition to the behaviour of the non-exporters that switch 
to become exporters, which has been addressed in the previous two tables, existing 
exporters can increase their exported output, either by redirecting their output or 
expanding their exports.  
 
Table 4.3 gives the transition matrices that describe the movement in export 
intensity of the continuously exporting plants during the period 1995-2000.
15 It 
suggests large numbers of exporting plants in the pre-crisis period (1995-96) 
increased export intensity during the period 1997-2000. About 70 percent of plants 
with low export intensity in the pre-crisis period moved to the class of plants with 
                                                 
14 Because of the data limitation, we were able to examine the behaviour of the new exporting plants 
only until the data for 2000. The variable documenting the plant export intensity unfortunately is not 
included in the data set for the data published after 2000.  
15 See the previous footnote for the reason of why Table 3.3, as well as Table 3.4, did not include the 
statistics for 2002-04.   24
higher export intensity in 1999 and 2000. Similarly, almost 50 percent of plants with 
medium export intensity in the pre-crisis period moved to the class of plants with high 
export intensity. The table also suggests, for a given export intensity class, there is 
some degree of persistence in which plants are unlikely to have been downgraded to 
lower export intensity classes. For example, less than 10 percent of exporting plants 
with high export intensity in the pre-crisis period were downgraded to medium class 
export intensity in all years between 1997 and 2000. 
 
Table 4.3  Distribution of continuously exporting plants (%) by export 
intensity classes, period 1995-96 to 2000. 
 
1995-96 1997  1998 
   Export intensity class:  Export intensity class: 
   Low  Medium  High  Low Medium Large 
Export intensity class:             
   Low   59.1  27.0  13.9  65.5 31.0  3.4 
   Medium   10.7  54.8  34.4  4.3 46.4  49.3 
   High   0.6  8.4  91.0  0.6 8.3  91.2 
           Table 4.3 continued 
            
Table 4.3 concluded           
1995-96 1999  2000 
   Export intensity class:  Export intensity class: 
   Low  Medium  Large  Low Medium Large 
Export intensity class:             
   Low   30.0  34.0  36.0 26.2 38.9  34.9 
   Medium   10.4  41.7  47.9  8.4 45.3  46.3 
   High   1.4  8.3  90.3  0.9 7.8  91.2 
Note: See Table 4.2 for the definition of export intensity classes.      
 
Table 4.4 shows the percentage difference in export intensity of continuously 
exporting plants during the 1997-2000 and 1995-96 periods. Plants with all output 
exported in the periods (i.e. plants with export intensity equal to 1) were excluded 
from the sample because retaining them would have been likely to understate the 
statistics. The mean and median of the difference are -14 and -10 per cent for the peak 
of the crisis (period 1997-98), reflecting the severity of the impact on exports. 
However, the average becomes positive for the recovery period (1999-2000).  
 
The table shows very a large variation in the difference, even in the recovery 
period. The percentage difference for about 50 percent of the observations is bounded 
between -21 and 23 percent (i.e. the difference between the 75
th and 25
th percentiles). 
The bounding spread widens significantly, to between -84 and 92 percent, when 
another 30 percent of observations are added (i.e. the difference between the 90
th and 
10
th percentiles). The description that many exporting plants sharply contracted their 
exported output is in line with the general perception that an export-led recovery did 
not materialise despite the large boost to competitiveness. The other part of the 
picture, which indicates a large expansion in export performance, suggests there are 
factors which allowed some plants to avoid the constraints of the export-led recovery.    25
Table 4.4  Percentage difference in plant export propensity (%ΔEXPit) between 
periods 1997-2000 and 1995-96: descriptive statistics. 
 
Percentage differences in plant export intensity (%ΔEXPit)  Statistics 
Between 1997-98 and 1995-96Between 1999-2000 and 1995-96 
      (Peak of the crisis)  (Recovery) 
Mean -14.5  3.8 
Median -9.8  1.0 
Standard deviation  69.1  89.5 
Interquartile range  50.3  44.3 
Percentiles:    
   10%  -73.4  -84.2 
   25%  -43.1  -21.3 
   75%  7.3  22.9 
   90%  44.4  91.6 
 
Did foreign ownership matter? 
 
The tables so far point to the importance of sunk cost of exporting and ability 
to compete in international market as a potential determinants of the export supply 
response of Indonesian manufacturing firms during and after the crisis. As reviewed, 
the other potential determinant besides these two is foreign ownership.  
 
Table 4.5 disaggregate the transition rates presented earlier in Table 4.1 by 
plant ownership status. The table seems to suggest that the likelihood of a firm to 
switch to become an exporter is higher for firms with foreign ownership. Excluding 
the rates for the deep crisis period, the transition rates from non-exporting to 
exporting were significantly higher for the group of foreign than those for the group 
of domestic-private plants. The fact that the difference applies for both the recovery 
and pre-crisis periods provide more support for the ‘self-selection’ hypothesis and the 
sunk-cost model of exporting.  
 
The role of foreign ownership in determining the success of export response 
can clearly also be seen in the movement from exporting to non-exporting. That is, 
exporting foreign firms are suggested to have survived better in export market. Again, 
excluding the rates for the deep crisis period, the transition rates reflecting this were 
higher for the group of foreign plants, compared to the group of private-domestic 
plants, both for the recovery and pre-crisis periods. 
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Table 4.5  Transition rates of plants (%) in export market by status of ownership: 1993-2000 and 2002-03. 
 
F o r e i g n   p l a n t s                 
      Pre-crisis  Deep crisis  Recovery period 
Year t status  Year t+1 status  1993-4  1994-5  1995-6  Average  1996-7 1997-8 1998-9  Average  1999-2000 2002-03 2003-04 Average 
No export  No export 72.1  74.6  70.6  72.4  89.3 100.0 59.8  83.0  77.6 67.9 66.7 70.7 
   Export  27.9  25.4  29.4  27.6  10.7 0.0 40.2  17.0  22.4 32.1 33.3 29.3 
Export No  export 19.2  15.8  9.9  14.9  44.5 80.6 87.1 70.7  14.5 13.4 13.1 13.7 
   Export  80.8  84.2  90.1  85.1  55.5 19.4 12.9 29.3  85.5 86.6 86.9 86.3 
                    
P r i v a t e   d o m e s t i c   p l a n t s               
      Pre-crisis  Deep crisis  Recovery period 
Year t status  Year t+1 status  1993-4  1994-5  1995-6  Average  1996-7 1997-8 1998-9  Average  1999-2000 2002-03 2003-04 Average 
No export  No export 95.0  95.3  93.4  94.6  95.9 100.0 87.5  94.5  96.0 93.4 93.2 94.2 
   Export  5.0  4.7  6.6  5.4  4.1 0.0  12.5  5.5  4.0 6.6 6.8 5.8 
Export No  export 27.9  23.3  17.1  22.8  50.7 85.9 87.2 74.6  15.8 30.2 30.8 25.6 
   Export  72.1  76.7  82.9  77.2  49.3 14.1 12.8 25.4  84.2 69.8 69.2 74.4 
                
G o v e r n m e n t - o w n e d   p l a n t s              
      Pre-crisis  Deep crisis  Recovery period 
Year t status  Year t+1 status  1993-4  1994-5  1995-6  Average  1996-7 1997-8 1998-9  Average  1999-2000 2002-03 2003-04 Average 
No export  No export 83.4  88.6  84.3  85.4  89.8 100.0 72.0  87.3  91.8 86.1 86.3 88.1 
   Export  16.6  11.4  15.7  14.6  10.2 0.0 28.0  12.7  8.2 13.9  13.7  11.9 
Export No  export 32.0  31.5  18.7  27.4  55.7 93.2  100.0  83.0  24.5 28.4 28.9 27.3 
   Export  68.0  68.5  81.3  72.6  44.3 6.8  0.0 17.0  75.5 71.6 71.1 72.7 
Note: 1. Foreign plants is defined as plants with positive foreign ownership share.               
              Private domestic plants are defined as plants with 100 per cent of private domestic ownership share.           
              Government plants are defined as plants with either 100 per cent of governement owenership share or a joint venture between private-domestic and government  
              plant.                            
 Table 4.6  Percentage difference in plant export propensity (%ΔEXPit) between 
periods 1997-2000 and 1995-96 by ownership status: descriptive 
statistics. 
 
Percentage differences in plant export intensity (%ΔEXPit)  Statistics 
Between 1997-98 and 1995-96  Between 1999-2000 and 1995-96 
     (Deep crisis)  Recovery) 
Mean    
  Foreign  -6.97  21.80 
  Private domestic  -17.03  -1.26 
  Government  -12.60  8.00 
       
Median    
    Foreign -7.69 5.13 
  Private domestic  -10.50  0.00 
  Government  -10.97  1.00 
       
Standard deviation     
  Foreign  67.10  102.10 
  Private domestic  70.28  87.89 
  Government  60.64  65.30 
       
Interquartile range     
  Foreign  54.90  48.90 
  Private domestic  49.10  44.62 
  Government  68.00  28.87 
 
Table 4.6, which displays the summary statistics of the percentage difference 
in export intensity between the 1997-2000 and 1995-96 (pre-crisis) periods, provides 
a picture for the importance of foreign ownership in shaping the export supply 
responses. The average contraction in export intensity during the peak of the crisis is 
lowest for the group of foreign plants. As for the recovery period, the average 
expansion in export intensity is higher for the group of foreign plants. 
  
However, the statistics for the variation in the differences do not really suggest 
a superiority of foreign plants. While the variation during the peak of the crisis is 
similar across the group of plants, it changes significantly in the recovery period. The 
variation is significantly higher for the group of foreign plants, relative to the other 
groups of plants. This suggests foreign plants did not necessarily respond better than 
other plants in terms of export intensity. 
 
4. 2  The econometrics analysis 
 
The descriptive analysis above has suggested two factors that contributed to 
the lack of positive export response of the firms on the improved terms of trade, 
namely the inability of the firms in immediately engaging in export activities and 
foreign ownership. This result, however, may not be robust, since some other factors 
may at the same time also contributed to the result. Therefore, it is necessary to 
conduct an econometrics analysis to ensure the robustness of the results. In what 
follows, the estimating equations 3.1 (or 3.3) and 3.2 were estimated.     28
4.2.1 Hypotheses 
Recalling the equations, the plant’s export participation in the previous year 
( 1 , − t i EP ) represents the inability of firms in immediately engaging in export activities, 
and based on the theory reviewed in Section 2, it is expected to be positively related to 
the current year export participation ( t i EP, ). The importance of foreign ownership is 
represented by FOR , the variable that defines the share of foreign ownership share in 
a plant. Based on the literature reviewed in Section 2, it is also expected to be 
positively related to the  t i EP, . 
 
In addition to  t i EP,  and FOR , the regression included some other plant-level 
independent variables to control for the other firm-level characteristics. The inclusion 
of these variables is important since, as noted in Geroski (1998), emphasising the role 
of firm characteristics has become an increasingly important consideration in the 
empirical studies examining firm performance. The followings are these variables and 




The impact of size on export supply response is difficult to predict a priori. 
Larger firms may respond positively because of advantage stemming from economies 
of scale, sophisticated management, and wide international network. Despite this, a 
negative relationship may also occur, i.e. smaller firms respond better than the larger 
ones. This is because small and medium firms in Indonesia often use some specific 
ways or channels, such as sub-contracting and using informal sources, to engage 




The effect of firm age is also ambiguous. On the one hand, older firms tend to 
be more experienced, suggesting a positive relationship between age and export 
supply response. On the other, adjustment to a change in business environment could 
be more difficult to older firms; younger firms tend to be more dynamic than the older 
ones. A positive relationship may also be observed because younger firms in 
Indonesia tend to be exporters, owing to the export-oriented policies in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s (Ramstetter 1999). 
 
Plant-level labour productivity (LP) and factor intensity (PCI or PSI) 
 
Fiercer competition in export markets means firms need to be efficient in order 
to survive, i.e., “self-selection hypothesis”. This suggests a positive relationship 
between plant level labour productivity and export supply response. Plant level factor 
intensity, i.e. capital intensity and skill intensity, are also expected to be positively 
related to export response. The argument is that plants using advanced technology and 
employing skilled workers are able to be more cost-efficient. Despite this, a negative 
relationship might be observed for skill intensity. Along with high inflation, higher 
labour quality implies higher wage expenses, which could have mitigated the increase 
in competitiveness unless labour was willing to take lower real wages and salary 
during the crisis. In addition to reflecting differences in costs, plant level factor    29
intensity is also able to capture the difference in product quality. Product quality is 
another important factor as it is often asserted that the foreign market requires a more 
sophisticated quality of goods than domestic markets. 
 
Financial leverage (LEV) 
 
Credit contraction could also be one of the important factors affecting the low 
export supply response in the previous sub-section. The argument is that the lack of 
loanable funds increases this financial constraint, reduces investment and hence 
undermines the boost to competitiveness from the sharp exchange rate depreciation. 
Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between financial leverage and export 
supply response. 
 
Import dependency (IMDEP) 
 
The extent to which exchange rate positively affects the profitability of 
exporting firms depends on the share of imported input they use in production. The 
positive impact is only minimal if production involves a large share of imported input, 
since higher expenditure on imported input counteracts the relative lower labour costs 
(Forbes 2002a). Accordingly, the share of imported input to total input is expected to 
be negatively related to export-supply response. 
4.2.2 Results 
 
Table 4.7 and 4.8 present the maximum likelihood estimation results of the 
export participation equation (i.e. equation 3.1 or 3.3) for the period 1993-2000 
(Period 1) and 2002-04 (Period 2), respectively. Several specification were tried at 
the experimental stage, and they revealed that LP, PCI and PSI gave better results – in 
terms of R-squared – if they were included separately. The experiment also revealed 
that LP, SIZE and AGE were better to be included in their natural logarithm value, 
instead of in their nominal value. The estimations for the period 2002-04 did not 
include AGE variable because information to compute the variable is not included in 
the SI survey for the period. The tables report the robust standard error since data 
examination revealed that the variance is heteroscedastic. The Wald test for 
exogeneity of confirm that  t i EP, is endogeneous. The estimations used two year lags of 
the  i EP for the 1993-2000 estimations, one year lag of  i EP for the 2002-04 
estimations, and all other independent variables as the instruments.  
 
The coefficients of  1 , − t i EP from the estimations of Period 1 and 2 are both 
positive (Table 4.7 and 4.8). Therefore, being an exporter in the previous year 
significantly increases the probability to stay as exporter in the current year. 
Comparing the results between the two periods, however, the magnitude of the 
coefficients is substantially larger for the results of Period 2. This suggests the impact 
of exporting history was higher in the recovery rather than in the crisis and early 
recovery period (1999-2000).  
 
Considering that improved terms of trade during and after the crisis, one 
possible explanation for this large difference is the severe impact of the crisis, which 
in turn constrained the firms to increase their exported production. A support for this    30
proposition is shown by the coefficient of LEV, which represents the degree of firms’ 
financial constraint. The degree of financial constraint is relevant to see this point 
because the Indonesian financial sector, which intermediates the flow of fund from 
public to business sector, collapsed during the crisis. The coefficients of LEV switch 
from negative to positive in the estimation result of Period 1 and 2. Although the 
coefficients are less significant for the results of Period 2, this finding suggests that 
firms were no longer financially constrained to start exporting during the recovery 
period. This finding, i.e. the negativity of LEV, also indicates that many firms in 
Indonesia still rely on external sources to finance their export activities.  
 
Table 4.7  The determinants of export participation, the period 1993-2000 
 
   Dependent variable  
Independent variable  EPt-1 EPt-1 EPt-1 
Exporting in the previous year (EP)t-1  0.246 0.247 0.242 
   (17.86)**  (17.86)**  (17.55)** 
Capital intensity (PCIt) 3.90
a       
   (0.83)       
Skill intensity (PSIt)     0.001    
      (0.88)    
Labour productivity (ln(LPt))        -0.016 
         (8.13)** 
Foreign ownership (FORt)  0.126 0.126 0.131 
   (5.33)**  (5.33)** (5.56)** 
Financial leverage (LEVt)  -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
   (1.47)  (1.47) (2.97)** 
Size (ln(SIZE,t))  0.027 0.027 0.020 





   (0.94)  (0.83) (0.99) 
Imported-input dependence (IMDEPt)  0.030 0.030 0.032 
   (2.43)*  (2.41)*  (2.59)** 
Constant  0.057 0.059 0.148 
   (1.65)+  (1.68)+  (4.06)** 
Wald  chi-squared  19820.38 19812.49 19963.13 
Observations  53278 53269 53278 
Notes: 1. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses       
             2. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
             3. The coefficients of the dummy variables for year and regions are suppressed to simplify the presentation. 
             4. The coefficients of the dummy variables for industry (at two-digit level) are reported in Table 4.11. 
              a. The coefficient was multiplied by 10
-9 to improve presentation.     
              b. The coefficient was multiplied by 10
-4 to improve presentation.    
 
Turning to the group of variables that represent firm-level labour productivity 
and factor intensity, the results are rather disappointing. Of all three relevant 
variables, i.e. ln(LP), PCI and PSI, only the coefficients of ln(LP) are statistically 
significant. Moreover, there is a conflicting result. The coefficient of ln(LP) for Period 
1 is negative whereas it is positive for Period 2. The result for Period 1, which is not 
consistent with the theory, implies that, during the crisis, it had been more difficult for 
a more productive firm to switch to exporting than a less productive firm. While this 
might be true, the result could have also been affected by the fact that almost all firms    31
greatly suffered from the crisis, and thus even a very productive firm should have a 
great difficulty in positively responding to the significantly improved competitiveness 
from the sharply depreciated exchange rate. This result actually is consistent with the 
previous finding, which was the negativity of LEV variable. Looking from this 
perspective, a very productive and efficient firm should have been having difficulty 
from not having enough financial support from banks (e.g. in the form of working 
capital) to expand its export albeit the higher chance it had. 
 
The positive and strongly significant ln(LP) coefficient for the result of Period 
2 strongly supports the self-selection hypothesis, where firms need to be efficient to 
compete in highly competitive export markets.  
 
Table 4.8  The determinants of export participation, the period 2002-04 
 
Dependent variable  
Independent variable  EPt-1 EPt-1 EPt-1 
Exporting in the previous year (EP)t-1  2.772 2.648 2.227 
   (3.67)**  (3.39)** (2.78)** 
Capital intensity (PCIt) 1.36
a       
   (0.62)       
Skill intensity (PSIt)     0.033    
      (1.44)    
Labour productivity (ln(LPt))        0.071 
         (3.25)** 
Foreign ownership (FORt)  0.442 0.476 0.537 
   (1.78)+  (1.87)+  (2.16)* 
Financial leverage (LEVt)  0.078 0.083 0.120 
   (1.25)  (1.33) (1.85)+ 
Size (ln(SIZE,t))  0.152 0.166 0.202 
   (1.63)  (1.73)+  (2.14)* 
Imported-input dependence (IMDEPt)  0.026 0.036 0.044 
   (0.26)  (0.36) (0.44) 
Constant  -2.546 -2.600 -3.364 
   (8.84)**  (8.84)** (7.71)** 
Observations  11203 11202 11203 
Notes: 1. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses       
             2. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
             3. The coefficients of the dummy variables for year and regions are suppressed to simplify the presentation. 
             4. The coefficients of the dummy variables for industry (at two-digit level) are reported in Table 4.12. 
              a. The coefficient was multiplied by 10
-10 to improve presentation.     
 
The coefficients of FOR are positive across the specifications for the results of 
Period 1 and 2. Therefore, firms with some foreign ownership would have higher 
chance to participate in export compared to their domestic counterparts. In addition, 
and perhaps is more importantly, the statistical significance of the coefficients 
however is larger for the result of Period 1 compared to those of Period 2. This 
suggests that foreign partners (i.e. parent companies) tended to help their severely 
affected domestic partners. This finding supports the other observation by Blomstrom 
and Lipsey (1993) reviewed earlier. 
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The coefficient of ln(SIZE) are positive across all specification and for both 
periods, albeit much less statistically significant for the results of the specification in 
Period 2. This suggests larger plants had higher probability of participating in export 
over the periods. This finding, while supporting a general hypothesis that the 
probability of exporting increases with size, also provides another evidence to support 
the self-selection hypothesis. This is because one possible reason for the positive 
relationship is the cost advantage derived from the economies of scale.  
 
The result on the other variables, meanwhile, suggests that older firms tend to 
have been easier to start exporting than younger firms. The coefficients of ln(AGE) 
are negative and statistically insignificant. This finding accords the theoretical 
prediction although less consistent with the situation in Indonesia where many of the 
exporting firms should be relatively young. This is because the export-oriented 
industrialisation in Indonesia was only started in late 1980s or early 1990s. 
 
Table 4.9  The determinants of the change in export intensity, the period 1993-
2000 
 
Dependent variable  
Independent variable  EXPGt EXPGt EXPGt 
Capital intensity (PCIi,t-2) 8.22
a       
   (1.55)       
Skill intensity (PSIi,t-2)     -0.002    
      (0.14)    
Labour productivity (ln(LPt-2))        -1.068
b 
         (0.01) 
Foreign ownership (FORi,t-2)  0.198 0.195 0.195 
    (1.79)+ (1.76)+ (1.77)+ 




   (0.21)  (0.13) (0.16) 
Size (ln(SIZEi,t-2)) -0.001  0.0003  -0.0002 
   (0.03)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Age (ln(AGEi,t-2))  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
   (0.55)  (0.57) (0.56) 
Imported-input dependence (IMDEPt-2)  -0.192 -0.198 -0.199 
   (2.42)*  (2.49)*  (2.50)* 
Inverted Mills ratio  0.979  0.970  0.948 
   (2.88)**  (2.85)** (2.83)** 
Constant  -0.607 -0.593 -0.595 
    (1.85)+ (1.81)+ (1.82)+ 
Observations  5283 5283 5283 
Notes: 1. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses       
           2. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
           3. The coefficients of the dummy variables for year, industry (at ISIC two-digit level) and regions are  
               suppressed to simplify the presentation.       
           a. The coefficient was multiplied by 10
-8 to improve presentation.     
           b. The coefficient was multiplied by 10
-4 to improve presentation.    
           c. The coefficient was multiplied by 10
-5 to improve presentation.     
 
Table 4.9 presents the estimation results for the adjustment in export 
propensity (i.e. equation 3.2) for the period 1993-2000 (Period 1). The estimations for    33
the period 2002-04 (Period 2) were not conducted since SI data for this period do not 
provide information about the plants’ export propensity. Based on the results in the 
experimental stage, Table 4.9 presents the results with two-years lag in all explanatory 
variables. This is to ensure that specifications are identified and that explanatory 
variables are exogeneous. 
 
The estimated coefficients of the inverse Mills ratio are positive and 
statistically very significant across the specifications, suggesting a positive correlation 
in the disturbance between the export participation and export propensity growth 
equation, and therefore, neglecting this correlation would likely to give bias in the 
result of the export propensity growth equation. 
 
The result in general shows a similar picture to that of the export participation 
equation. Few important points, nevertheless, are worth mentioning. First, for the 
variables representing the self-selection hypothesis, namely ln(LP), PSI  and PCI, 
only the coefficient of ln(LP)  is positive, while the coefficients of the other two 
variables are negative. Nevertheless, all of these coefficients are highly statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that being superior to other firms – in terms of efficiency – 
did not affect the change in their export response to the improved competitiveness.  
 
Second, the result also highlights the importance of foreign ownership. The 
coefficient of FOR are consistently positive across the specifications and statistically 
significant, albeit only at 10 per cent level. This finding also confirms the earlier 
observation in the descriptive analysis.  
 
Third, in contrast to the result of export participation equation, the result in Table 4.9 
does not indicate that the extent of financial constraint matter in determining the 
export supply response of the exporters. The coefficients of LEV are very statistically 
insignificant, indicating the low confidence level of the estimated coefficients. 
4.2.3 Discussion 
 
Several points are worth mentioning regarding the above estimation results. 
 
First, the positive and rather strong effect of exporting history, captured by 
1 , − t i EP , highlights the presumption that exporting is costly and often a slow business 
activity to initiate. This brings an important implication. That is, the improved terms 
of trade from the exchange rate depreciation is likely to have been captured only by 
plants which had been exporting prior the period with the improved terms of trade, or 
in other words, before the crisis. This perhaps could explain the low switching rate 
from non-exporting to exporting observed in the descriptive analysis. The finding 
suggests it is likely to observe a quick adjustment for firms that have had some 
exporting experience, but this is not necessarily so for firms that sell their entire 
output to the domestic market. The redirection is still possible, although it likely 
happens with a lag. 
 
Second, the findings that support the self-selection hypothesis provide another 
reason for the observed low switching rate from non-exporting to exporting. That is, 
the low switching rate may be because most non-exporting plants were either not 
ready or not prepared to switch. Supporting this, it is often observed that new    34
exporters exhibit similar characteristics to established exporters. Bernard and Jensen 
(1999) found that new US exporters show similar characteristics two or three years 
before they actually begin to export. Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2002) found many 
domestic-private exporters in some Asian countries closely resembled foreign 
exporters, which was interpreted as an indication that the focus of exports is the likely 
intent right from when firms are first created. 
 
Third, the findings regarding foreign ownership strongly supports the 
proposition by Blomstrom and Lipsey (1993) that it is easier for foreign firms to 
increase their exported output or redirect sales in the event of positive economic 
shock.
16 The finding which shows that the effect of foreign ownership was 
particularly important in the Period 1 supports the view that subsidiaries are likely to 
have been financially supported by their parent companies.  
 
Fourth, related to the previous point, the finding of the less importance of the 
impact of foreign ownership on export participation during the period 2002-04 may 
have reflected the growing supply-side constraint stemming from some structural 
problems. As reviewed in the beginning, some studies have noted that deteriorating 
infrastructure and unconducive investment policy have substantially increased the cost 
of production, including the rigid labour policy. Thus, during this period, the relative 
competitiveness of being foreign firms is likely to have been offset, and hence, the 
chance of some foreign firms to be able to positively respond the improved terms of 
trade should have been lowered. The supply-side constraint presumably would also 
negatively affect domestic firms, not only the foreign ones. Therefore, it is not a 
surprise if one observes a low aggregate increase in export given the improved terms 
of trade after the crisis. 
 
4.3  Some insights from firm-level case study 
 
This study undertook some in-depth interviews with senior-level managers of 
few firms in the Indonesian manufacturing, located in greater Jakarta. As noted, the 
interviews aim to gain more insights into the questions of the study and supplement 
the result of the statistical analysis. Because of the very limited respondents, some 
biases in the findings are unavoidable and hence the findings are not attempted to 
address the issue in great detail.  
 
The respondents were three firms from textile-and-garment and electronic industry.
17 
The main characteristics of these firms are given in Table 4.10.  
 
4.3.1  The interviews results: a summary 
The garment-and-textile company (Firm  1) 
 
The firm produces under an Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) 
arrangement for a leading brand, but most of this is limited to fabric purchases and 
                                                 
16 Our finding is also consistent with the finding of Blomstrom and Lipsey on the response of the Latin 
America’s firms to the exchange rate crisis in 1980s. 
17 At the beginning of the study, we sent out 12 letters for interview. Out of these letters, we received 
five feedbacks, saying that there are willing to be interviewed. However, due to some problems and 
many rearrangements for the interview, at the end we only managed to have three interviews.    35
Cut-Make-Trim (CMT). The remaining segments, for example, selecting suppliers, 
design, and technological specifications, mostly come from buyers. Customers 
typically provide the firm with some exact prototype product orders. Tight schedules 
are a frequently encountered difficulty. Since the firm does not undertake all of their 
own procurement, overdue supplies often causes problems in meeting required 
response times.   
 
Table 4.10  The main characteristics of the interviewed firms 
 
Firm Main  products  Characteristics 
Firm 1 
  
Textiles and garments  Large  and  domestic-owned 
company,  vertically 
integrated firm, domestic 
and export orientation 
Firm 2  Electronic  components: 
touch screen for computer 
monitor and other 
electronic devices. 
Large and joint-venture 
company, domestic and 
export orientation 
Firm 3  Consumer  electronics: 
television sets, audio 
products and computer 
monitors 
Large and domestic-owned 
company; domestic and 
exports orientation 
 
Lack of market information prevents the firm from directly exporting to the 
end market, requiring instead that they go through intermediaries (importers, 
wholesalers, sourcing agents, or distributors). This furthers curtails the firm’s profit 
margin. The products are mass production elements, thus sensitive to cost structure 
changes i.e. labour, fuels. The company also mentioned a problem with rising wages 
and fuel costs, which further eroded comparative advantage. Common strategies for 
facing increased competition are economical use of capacity through maintaining little 
inventory while upgrading machinery. 
 
As crisis hit, it tried to adjust supply by switching to a relatively cheaper 
suppliers. The firm struggled to survive in the few months following the beginning of 
the crisis because almost all of its output, i.e. about 90 per cent, was sold 
domestically. The firm, in its attempt to increase the likelihood of survival, started to 
initiate export expansion activities, through their established marketing channels. 
Finally, the firm successfully redirected much of its output to their new expanded 
export market. During the crisis, it was able to increase its export propensity from 
about 10 to 45 per cent. The firm continued to maintain its crisis-export propensity 
even until now.  
 
It was admitted by the manager that the success of the firm in redirecting their 
sales to export markets was, to large extent, due to its experience in selling small 
portion of their product overseas. The manager also mentioned that the firm’s 
experience and networks made its attempt to redirect sales much easier than the other 
similar domestic firms that sell all of their output domestically. The success, however, 
was not without a cost. The firm had to reduce its employment in the attempt to 
increase productivity and efficiency, mainly to increase its competitiveness - vis a vis 
exporters from other countries – in its export markets.    36
 
The firm used the services of foreign bank to get the working capital and letter 
of credit (LC). This is because the industry was classified into a high-risk industry by 
the central bank during the peak of the crisis, which obviously constrained the firm to 
acquire loans from domestic banks. 
  
The joint-venture electronic company (Firm 2) 
 
Foreign ownership and trade networks cushioned the firm from the severe 
impact of crisis. The latter comes as the result of technology transfer that allows the 
firm to produce the goods that competitive – in terms of quality – in export markets. 
This occurred after its Japanese principal was taken over by an U.S company. The 
take over facilitated the firm to increase its export competitiveness by providing 
technical and capital assistance which eventually resulted in an upgraded technology 
capability of the firm. The significant technology upgrading is clearly indicated by the 
fact that, unlike most subsidiaries which rarely acquired either technological or design 
capability or both from their principals, the firm claimed to have started conducting 
research and development (R&D) of its own.  
 
Access to export market did benefit the firm during crisis. It gained from 
access to export market provided by its foreign counterparts. The counterparts, apart 
from their main responsibility to provide raw materials and other inputs, connect most 
of the company buyers. Considering the large variation of the buyers’ preference, the 
firm has always been successful in exercising this strategy because it has a flexible 
production system, which allows it to quickly respond to the changing consumers’ 
needs, such as a limited production of a variety of models and shorter manufacturing 
cycle. Despite this success, the firm was forced to increase its domestic sales, mainly 
because of the growing consumer goods demand domestically. At the moment, the 
firm sells about 80 per cent of its products to domestic market and exports the rest 
 
The domestic-owned electronic company (Firm 3) 
 
As a strategy to overcome the impact of crisis, the firm entered the licensing 
agreement to sell products under foreign brand name. Like the other firm that engaged 
in industrial networks, the management realized that the company would benefit from 
the bigger network that the counterpart has. Almost 70 per cent of its total production 
was exported under the foreign brand name. While the company focuses on ASEAN 
market – indicated and proven by the establishment of branch office in Singapore –, 
the marketing activities for the other international markers are conducted through its 
foreign counterparts. 
 
In terms of getting new export markets access, it is worth mentioning here that 
the firm could get the access through foreign banks, as one of its major source for 
external financing, as much as it could get from its own marketing activities and 
foreign counterparts.  
 
The partnership agreement with the foreign counterparts did save the company 
from the severe impact of the crisis as it had more access to input and export market. 
Because of its strong export orientation, the collapse of domestic market during the 
crisis did not severely affect its performance.    37
4.3.2  Some key findings from the interviews 
 
The interviews summarised above provide us with four major points that are 
worth highlighting.  
 
First, the availability of networks determines the success of firms in 
responding to the improved terms of trade. The interviews suggest companies that 
engage in industrial networks performed relatively better in terms of exports during 
and after crisis than those that did not. The interviews determine at least four types of 
networks that a firm can engage in: trade, production, technology and ownership. 
Firms that had trade and flexible production network could easily switch their outputs 
from domestic to export markets, and adjust their production strategy in order to 
benefit from the Rupiah depreciation. Thus, and as indicated by the experience of two 
firms we interviewed, firms that had been exporting long before the crisis performed 
well in boosting their export performance, since they were not necessarily facing an 
expensive cost to enter a new market. Unlike the impact of trade networks, one aspect 
of production network, i.e. the flexibility of a firm in choosing the source of inputs, 
appears to only slightly cushion the companies from severe impact of the crisis.  
 
The ownership network matters by providing financial assistance and market 
access. As in the case of electronic component firm, the ownership network resulted 
in a technology upgrading, which in turn helped the firm in improving the quality of 
the goods that are able to compete in highly competitive export markets. Moreover, 
which was also illustrated by this company, the ownership network does not 
necessarily work by giving the company with market access, but also by providing the 
company with access to some much cheaper production inputs. 
 
Second, among several other factors, limited access to capital and deteriorated 
infrastructure are often mentioned as the main factors hindering the ability of 
companies in taking positive impact from the sharp exchange rate depreciation. The 
textile-and-garment firm, for example, complained about the lack of government’s 
support to facilitate technology upgrading, particularly for the upgrading towards a 
more energy efficient technology – in response to the increasing trend in the fuel 
price. 
 
It is important to note here that foreign and joint venture banks – instead of 
domestic banks or financial institutions – are more reliable in providing financial 
supports for exporters. As in the case of textile-and-garment firm, financial supports 
during the peak of the crisis, and even up until now, was mainly provided by a 
Japanese bank. This is an interesting finding for Indonesia, bearing in mind that the 
policy specifies that foreign banks should allocate 50 per cent of their credit to export 
credit. It is also worth mentioning here that, according to the experience of the 
interviewed firms, the relationship with foreign banks do help firms to establish 
marketing and production networks, and thus reinforces the positive impact of having 
the relationship with foreign banks. 
 
Third, unlike what is commonly believed, the role of trade facilitators does not 
appear to have given significant positive impact to firm export supply response. In the 
case of the firms we interviewed, the role trade facilitator was very limited, except for 
the textile-and-garment firm. As for the other two companies, they set up their own    38
marketing office in the prospective export markets and explored export markets 
through different channels, including trade exhibitions and internet. This, however, is 
rather contradictory to the fact that many Indonesia’s companies prefer to export on 
fob (freight on board) basis, and thus they would be better off by using the service of 
trade facilitators. 
 
Fourth, unreliable supporting industries prove to have inhibited the response of 
firms to the improved terms of trade. As indicated by the managers, unreliable 
domestic source forced firms to import the input materials and hence made the firms 
to bear a high import cost, owing to the large exchange rate depreciation. For firms in 
some industries, particularly the low-skilled export oriented industries – such as 
textile-and-garment – this weakness often put the firm in uncompetitive situation vis-
à-vis its competitors from other countries.  
 
4.2 Brief analysis on the cost for exporting 
 
The econometric analysis earlier has shown the importance of cost for 
exporting in determining the success of a firm in switching from non-exporter to 
exporter. Accordingly, it is important to further elaborate this subject, and this sub-
section aims to do so.  
 
Ideally, elaborating the subject should be done by measuring the extent of the 
export cost. While appealing, measuring such cost is very difficult, and might be not 
possible to be done. This is not only because the survey data used in this study do not 
have information that reveal the cost, but also because there could be just too many 
cost items that can be considered as the cost for exporting. Equally important, even if 
we could details the exact cost items, there is likely large variation in the extent of the 
cost across firms, industry, and different export destinations. 
 
Considering the difficulty, this study adopted the ‘second-best’ approach by 
examining the extent of the coefficient of the dummy variables for industry in the 
regression of the determinants of export participation.
18 This approach presumes that 
export cost varies across industries. It is important to note that the approach is a rather 
crude method in measuring the exporting cost, in the sense that it ‘infers’ rather than 
‘measures’ the extent of the exact cost. Nevertheless, it is definitely the best method 
to adopt given the limitation in the data. 
 
Table 4.11 and 4.12 present the coefficients of the industry dummy variables 
from the regression of the export participation equation for Period 1 (1993-2000) and 
2 (2002-04). It is worth mentioning here that the definition of the two-digit ISIC used 
in the regression is different between Period 1 and 2. This is because of the change in 
the use of ISIC version in the survey. To avoid the ‘dummy-variable trap’, dummy 
variables for ISIC 31 (food, beverages, and tobacco) and ISIC 15 (food and 
beverages) was used as the based dummy variable for the regression of Period 1 and 
2, respectively.  
 
Consider, first, the result from Table 4.11, the exporting cost during the crisis 
in garment-and-textile and basic chemical industries (ISIC 32 and 35, respectively) is 
                                                 
18 A referee suggested the authors to adopt this approach.    39
suggested to have been lower than the exporting cost in food-and-beverages industry. 
The coefficients of the dummy variables for these industries are negative across the 
three specifications, albeit only the coefficients of the dummy variables for the 
garment-and-textile have strong statistical significance. This finding is consistent with 
the fact that these industries are the industries that Indonesia has its comparative 




The results, meanwhile, suggest that the cost for exporting in the other 
industries were about the same with the exporting cost in the food-and-beverages 
industry. The coefficients of the dummy variables representing these industries are 
very statistically insignificant.  
 
Table 4.11  The coefficients of dummy variable for industry (at two-digit level of 
ISIC) from the determinants of export participation, the period 
1993-2000 
 
   Dependent variable  
Independent variable  EPt-1 EPt-1 EPt-1 
Dummy variable for ISIC 32 (Textile, garment and 
footwear)  -0.086 -0.086 -0.086 
    (2.15)* (2.14)* (2.15)* 
Dummy variable for ISIC 33 (Wood products, incl. 
furniture)  0.004 0.005 0.002 
   (0.09)  (0.10) (0.05) 
Dummy variable for ISIC 34 (Paper and paper products)  -0.032  -0.031  -0.034 
   (0.63)  (0.62) (0.67) 
Dummy variable for ISIC 35 (Chemical, rubber and 
plastics)  -0.062 -0.062 -0.064 
    (1.84)+ (1.83)+ (1.90)+ 
Dummy variable for ISIC 36 (Non-metallic mineral 
products)  0.038 0.038 0.035 
   (0.75)  (0.76) (0.70) 
Dummy variable for ISIC 37 (Basic metal industry)  -0.030  -0.029  -0.030 
   (0.79)  (0.78) (0.80) 
Dummy variable for ISIC 38 (Machinery and equipment)  -0.054  -0.053  -0.052 
   (1.25)  (1.24) (1.22) 
Notes: 1. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.       
           2. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.     
           3. The ISIC used in the regression, or reported in the table, is ISIC Rev. 2.     
           4. The results refers to the regression reported in Table 4.7.     
 
The picture changes quite significantly if we turn to the results in Table 4.12 
for the post-crisis period. First, there were only two industries, namely tobacco-
products and motor vehicle industry, which are suggested to have lower exporting 
cost than the exporting cost in food-and-beverage industry (ISIC 15). The coefficients 
of the dummy variables for these two industries are negatively large and statistically 
very significant. While quite many of the coefficients of the dummy variable for the 
other industries are also negative, such as those of the electronics, basic metal and 
iron, paper and paper products, many of these coefficients are often statistically 
                                                 
19 Rubber and rubber-based products are included in ISIC 35 of basic chemical industry.    40
insignificant. This indicates, to some extent, a high variation in the cost of exporting 
across firms in these industries.  
 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the results in Table 4.12 now suggest 
the cost of exporting in industries where Indonesia has its comparative advantage (i.e., 
labour- and resource-intensive industries) apparently was higher after the crisis – or 
during the recovery period – than during the deep crisis. This inference is derived 
from many positive and very statistically significant coefficients of the dummy 
variables for these industries. In particular, the industries included in this group are 
textiles products (ISIC 17), garment (ISIC 18), leather products and footwear (ISIC 
19), wood products (ISIC 20), and basic chemicals (ISIC 24). While further 
investigation is clearly needed, this finding is consistent with the general situation of 
deteriorating business climate after the crisis. As reviewed, in terms of business 
climate, Indonesia starting from the early 2000s was characterised with a deteriorating 
infrastructure and a rigid labour policy (see Section 2.4).   
 
Table 4.12  The coefficients of dummy variable for industry (at two-digit level of 
ISIC) from the determinants of export participation, the period 
2002-04 
Dependent variable  
Independent variable  EPt-1 EPt-1 EPt-1 
Dummy variable for ISIC 16 (Tobacco products)  -0.362  -0.361  -0.364 
   (2.35)* (2.32)*  (2.44)* 
Dummy variable for ISIC 17 (Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles)  0.459  0.462  0.454 
   (5.79)** (5.78)**  (5.82)** 
Dummy variable for ISIC 18 (Wearing apparel, except fur apparel)  0.564  0.576  0.598 
   (7.70)** (7.92)**  (8.11)** 
Dummy variable for ISIC 19 (Leather products and footwear)  0.329  0.345  0.389 
   (2.39)* (2.51)*  (2.83)** 
Dummy variable for ISIC 20 (Wood products)  0.351  0.387  0.495 
   (1.73)+ (1.86)+  (2.32)* 
Dummy variable for ISIC 21 (Paper and paper products)  -0.073  -0.073  -0.102 
   (0.44) (0.44)  (0.62) 
Dummy variable for ISIC 22 (Publishing and printing)  -0.150  -0.160  -0.197 
   (0.98) (1.05)  (1.29) 
Dummy variable for ISIC 23 (Non-metallic mineral products)  -0.074  -0.054  -0.009 
   (0.18) (0.13)  (0.02) 
Dummy variable for ISIC 24 (Basic chemicals)  0.248  0.237  0.200 
   (2.61)** (2.51)*  (2.10)* 
Dummy variable for ISIC 25 (Rubber and plastic products)  0.094  0.085  0.084 
   (1.07) (0.97)  (0.97) 
Dummy variable for ISIC 26 (Glass and glass products)  0.123  0.130  0.148 
   (1.56) (1.66)+  (1.89)+ 
Dummy variable for ISIC 27 (Basic iron and steel)  -0.048  -0.045  -0.100 
   (0.24) (0.22)  (0.51) 
Dummy variable for ISIC 28 (Metal products)  -0.102  -0.100  -0.114 
   (0.89) (0.88)  (1.01) 
Dummy variable for ISIC 29 (General purpose machinery)  -0.220  -0.216  -0.219 
   (1.27) (1.26)  (1.29) 
Dummy variable for ISIC 31 (Electric motors, generators and transformers)  0.233  0.234  0.204 
   (1.14) (1.15)  (1.01) 
Dummy variable for ISIC 32 (Electronic and other electronic components)  -0.562  -0.533  -0.531 
   (1.81)+ (1.75)+  (1.77)+ 
Dummy variable for ISIC 33 (Medical appliances and instruments) 0.527  0.513  0.450    41
   (1.23) (1.21)  (1.07) 
Dummy variable for ISIC 34 (Motor vehicles)  -0.619  -0.623  -0.693 
   (2.39)* (2.42)*  (2.66)** 
Dummy variable for ISIC 35 (Other transport machinery)  -0.345  -0.335  -0.361 
   (1.63) (1.60)  (1.72)+ 
Dummy variable for ISIC 36 (Furniture)  0.404  0.448  0.577 
   (1.72)+ (1.85)+  (2.31)* 
Notes: 1. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.     
           2. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.   
           3. The ISIC used in the regression, or reported in the table, is ISIC Rev. 3. 
           4. The results refers to the regression reported in Table 4.8.   
           5. The dummy variable for industry ISIC 30 and 37 were dropped by the regressions. 
 
 
V. Summary, conclusion and some possible policy 
recommendations 
 
This study was motivated by an observation that while there was an 
improvement in terms of trade after the 1997/98 economic crisis, Indonesia does not 
seem to have been able to improve its export performance. This study addresses this 
issue and attempts to answer the question of why there was only sluggish export 
response. In answering the question, this study details the picture of plant-level export 
supply response of the Indonesian manufacturing and investigates which factors 
explained the sluggish export response. 
 
Among the other findings, the descriptive analysis shows the extent of export 
participation of plants in the industry tends to have weakened over the period 2002-
04, or recovery period. This is albeit the rapid recovery immediately after the crisis 
over the period 1999-2000. The other important finding is the strong persistency of 
firms in either state of their exporting status (‘exporting’ or ‘non-exporting’). This 
suggests the lack of export response to the improved terms of trade could be caused 
by the inability of firms in immediately engaging in export activities. 
 
The major findings from the econometric analysis can be summarised as 
follows. First, being an exporter in the previous year significantly increases the 
probability to stay as exporter in the current year. However, the result suggests the 
impact of exporting history was higher in the recovery rather than in the crisis and 
early recovery period (1999-2000). Second, the results strongly support the self-
selection hypothesis, where firms need to be efficient to compete in highly 
competitive export markets. Third, in general, firms with some foreign ownership are 
suggested to have higher chance to participate in export compared to their domestic 
counterparts. However, the importance of this effect is shown to have been much 
weaker during the period 2002-04.  
 
In general, the econometric analysis confirms much of the picture from the 
descriptive analysis, and being able to provide a more robust quantitative method. 
Thus, it is important highlighting the main points derived from the estimations. First, 
the improved terms of trade from the exchange rate depreciation is likely to have been 
captured only by plants which had been exporting prior to crisis. This suggests it is 
likely to observe a success response from firms that have had some exporting    42
experience, but not necessarily so for firms that sell their entire output to the domestic 
market. The redirection is likely to happen with a lag. 
 
Second, the support for the self-selection hypothesis provides another reason 
for the observed unsuccessful response during and after the crisis. Firms may have 
been not ready or not prepared to enter export markets. This is consistent with other 
studies which found that new exporters tend to improve their performance in the few 
years leading up to exporting.  
 
Third, this study supports Blomstrom and Lipsey’s (1993) proposition that it is 
easier for foreign firms to increase their exported output or redirect sales in the event 
of positive economic shock. In Indonesian and the crisis context, this may have been 
due to some supports, particularly financial and market access support. 
 
Finally, the estimations indicated that the cost for exporting was quite 
differently between during and post-crisis. In particular, after the crisis, sectors which 
Indonesia has some comparative advantage, i.e., labour- and resource-intensive, seem 
to have had much higher cost for exporting, compared to the indication of the cost 
during the crisis. As highlighted, this might be due to the increasing supply-
constraints in Indonesian economy in the post-crisis period, in the form of a 
deteriorating infrastructure and a rigid labour policy. 
 
The in-depth interviews, meanwhile, provide more insights and confirm the 
some of the major findings from statistical analysis. Three main findings were derived 
from the interviews. First, the availability of networks, namely trade, production, 
technology and ownership network, determines the success of firms in responding to 
the improved terms of trade. The interviews suggest companies that engage in 
industrial networks performed relatively better in terms of exports during and after 
crisis, than those that did not. Second, limited access to capital and deteriorated 
infrastructure were often mentioned as the main constraints for firms in benefiting the 
sharp exchange rate depreciation. Third, unlike what is commonly believed, the role 
of trade facilitators does not appear to have given significant positive impact to firm 
export supply response. What was learnt from the interview is that the role of trade 
facilitators could be industry specific. In this study, textile-and-garment industry relies 
much on the facilitators while it is not the case with electronic industry. 
a.   Some possible policy recommendations  
Presuming that the trend of the improved terms of trade would continue, or 
maybe there would be another big jump in terms of trade in the future, the findings are 
clearly relevant for policy-making practice in Indonesia. The immediate implication is 
that, the policy should be focused on encouraging firms to start exporting, even if a 
firm is domestically oriented. The reason is obvious. The empirical analysis in this 
study indicates and confirms that exporting is costly and could be very slow business 
activity to be initiated. 
 
Encouraging firms to start exporting could be done in many ways. One, which 
also indicated by the empirical findings, is by attracting much higher flow of foreign 
direct investment (FDI). Again, the reason is obvious, foreign ownership is shown to 
have been important for shaping a successful export supply response after the crisis. 
One important policy action would be streamlining the procedure and process for    43
establishing business or exporting from Indonesia. As noted in the many reports, 
Indonesia currently stays at the bottom of the global ranking for this particular area. 
 
Related to effort to attract more FDI, the study also provides a clear signal on 
which direction the policy should go. In the last few years following the economic 
crisis of 1997/98, some attempts made by the government to attract FDI does not 
seem to have been very successful. Although it is still subject to further research, 
casual observation indicates the lack of knowledge from the policy makers on the real 
situation could be one of the important factors contributing to the policy failure.     
 
The importance of increasing FDI inflow is also very crucial in the context of 
relaxing the liquidity constraint faced by exporters. The finding from firm-level 
interview suggests the access to foreign source of fund , which often comes along a 
flow of FDI, serves as an alternative option in the light of minimum functioning of the 
domestic financial sector. This does not only apply in the context of deep crisis, or 
even during the recovery period. Currently, and despite the successful effort of the 
central bank and the government in maintaining macroeconomic stability, the 
contribution of domestic financial sector to private real sector is still considerably 
low.  
 
The other important policy suggestion is that the government should 
immediately remove the supply-constraints characterising the Indonesian economy 
post-crisis. This is clearly derived from the indication on the extent of the cost for 
exporting. In addition, the in-depth interviews revealed, for example, that weak 
infrastructure, particularly that enables firms to install energy-efficient machinery, 
significantly undermined the boost in competitiveness. 
    44
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As commonly adopted in other studies, SIZE is proxied by number of employees. The 
other proxies commonly used in the literature, such as output or profit, are not 
adopted since they are more sensitive to changes in business cycle. 
 
Age (AGE) 
AGE is proxied by the number of years the plant has been in commercial production. 
 
Foreign ownership (FOR) 
FOR is proxied by the percentage share of foreign ownership in a plant. 
 
Plant-level labour productivity (LP)  
LP is constructed by taking the ratio between real value added to employment. Price 
ratio at the three-digit ISIC level is used as the price deflator to compute the real value 
added. It is important to note here that LP tends to overstate the true real labour 
productivity, since the ideal denominator is hours of work – instead of number of 
working labour. The data on hours of work, however, are not available in the SI data, 
and therefore, this study proceeds with employment as the denominator.  
 
Factor intensity (PCI or PSI) 
In the absence of reliable data on capital stock, PCI is measured as follows 
 
employee)   of number    (total
added)    value wage - (non
PCI =  
 
       
employee)   of number    (total
salary)   and   (wages - (inputs) - output)   of   (value
=  
 
PSI is computed as the following 
 
employee)   of number    (total
salary)   and   on wages   e expenditur   (total
PSI =  
 
Financial leverage (LEV) 
While data on firms’ balance sheet is incomplete in the SI data, this study employs 





LEV =  
 
where 
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payment) (interest 
(EBIT)
Coverage) (Interest  =  
   
and  EBIT  is equal to sales (or earnings) before deduction of interest payments and 
income taxes. 
 
Interest coverage ratio measures the number of times a firm’s earnings exceed debt 
payments. It indicates how well a firm’s earnings can cover interest payments. In 
general, a low interest coverage ratio implies that a firm is highly leveraged (i.e. 
higher LEV) and has low capability to take on additional debt (i.e. more financially 
constrained). It is important bearing in mind that the ratio – as with the other leverage 
ratios – is very approximate. This is because the ratio tends to understate the true 
extent of a firm’s financial leverage, since it focuses only on servicing the interest 
liability and does not take into account debt repayment. Usually, repayment of debt 
principal is higher than the interest payment. 
 
Import dependency (IMDEP) 
Import dependence ( i IMDEP ) is proxied by the intensity of imported input in total 
input, defined as 
 
input)   domestic     imported   of   (value





The domestic input here is defined as the domestically produced input, which is 
different to the concept of domestic input in Input-Output Table sense.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 